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such as clearinghouses associated with securities exchanges. This Article asks whether 
regulators should expand the central clearing requirement to nonderivative financial 
contracts, such as loan agreements. This Article begins by theorizing how and why 
central clearing can reduce systemic risk. It then examines the theory’s regulatory and 
economic efficiency implications, first for current requirements to centrally clear 
derivatives contracts and thereafter for deciding whether to extend those requirements 
to nonderivative contracts. The inquiry has real practical importance because the 
aggregate monetary exposure on nonderivative financial contracts—and thus the 
potential systemic risk that could be triggered by that exposure—greatly exceeds that 
on derivatives contracts. The inquiry also raises fundamental legal questions as to 
why (and the extent to which) regulators should tell financial institutions how to 
control risk and whether to require the mutualization of risk. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the global financial crisis of 2007–2009 (the “financial crisis”), an 
increasing number of countries, including the United States, have been 
requiring most derivatives contracts to be cleared1 and settled2 through central 
counterparties (CCPs).3 CCPs are typically well-capitalized entities,4 often 
associated with derivatives, commodities, or other securities exchanges.5 The 
CCP legally substitutes its credit for that of the contracting parties, making the 
CCP the primary counterparty on both sides of the contract—for example, the 
buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer.6 The CCP thus ensures the 
 
1 Clearing is “the process of transmitting, reconciling and, in some cases, confirming transfer orders 
prior to settlement.” EUROPEAN CENT. BANK, GLOSSARY OF TERMS RELATED TO PAYMENT, 
CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS 5 (2009), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/
glossaryrelatedtopaymentclearingandsettlementsystemsen.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q2YK-9EQV]. It 
involves identifying the obligations of the parties to the transaction. 
2 Settlement is “the completion of a transaction or of processing with the aim of discharging 
participants’ obligations through the transfer of funds and/or securities.” Id. at 24. 
3 See infra notes 36–37 and accompanying text. 
4 Rather than having large equity cushions, CCPs are usually indirectly capitalized through 
the resources of their clearing members. See infra notes 162–67 and accompanying text. 
5 The three largest U.S. clearinghouses, for example, are CME Clearing Services, which provides 
clearing and settlement of exchange trades on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and the Chicago Board 
of Trade; ICE Clear U.S., which is owned by Intercontinental Exchange, an entity that also owns the 
New York Stock Exchange; and LCH, which is a unit of the London Stock Exchange Group. See Clearing 
Firms, CME GROUP, http://www.cmegroup.com/clearing/financial-and-regulatory-surveillance/
clearing-firms.html?redirect=/tools-information/clearing-firms.html [https://perma.cc/TPY2-2TBE]; 
Michelle Price, Three Biggest U.S. Clearing Houses Pass Liquidity Stress Tests: CFTC, REUTERS (Oct. 16, 
2017, 12:08 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cftc-clearing-tests/three-biggest-u-s-clearing-
houses-pass-liquidity-stress-tests-cftc-idUSKBN1CL09Q [https://perma.cc/6PJJ-A9SJ]. 
6 See PETER NORMAN, THE RISK CONTROLLERS 7-8 (2011); cf. R. BLISS & C. PAPATHANASSIOU, 
EUROPEAN CENT. BANK, DERIVATIVES CLEARING, CENTRAL COUNTERPARTIES AND NOVATION: 
THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 3 (2006), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/events/pdf/conferences/ccp/
BlissPapathanassiou_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/95F2-MJZU] (observing that the original “bilateral 
contract between two market participants is replaced by two bilateral contracts between each of the 
original counterparties and the CCP”); Richard Squire, Clearinghouses as Liquidity Partitioning, 99 
CORNELL L. REV. 857, 862 (2014) (“The clearinghouse interposes itself between the parties, serving as 
the counterparty to each. Instead of selling the cattle future to Buyer, Seller sells it to the clearinghouse, 
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performance of a financial contract even if a contracting party fails,7 thereby 
reducing counterparty risk8—the risk that a contracting party’s default will harm 
other parties to the contract. Regulators believe this reduction of counterparty 
risk will reduce “systemic” risk9—the risk that, in this context, a failure of one 
or more counterparties could lead to events that impair the financial system’s 
ability to function as a network10 and cause an economic collapse.11 
This emerging regulatory norm raises the question on which this Article 
focuses: should regulators also require other types of financial contracts 
(hereinafter “nonderivative financial contracts”) to be centrally cleared and 
settled, in order to reduce systemic risk?12 This inquiry has real practical 
importance because the aggregate counterparty exposure13 on nonderivative 
 
which sells an identical future to Buyer.”). The substitution of credit is legally referred to as a “novation,” 
which arises when a new party assumes a payment obligation that was incurred by a debtor on a contract 
and the original debtor is totally released from the obligation. 66 C.J.S. Novation § 1 (2019). 
7 NORMAN, supra note 6, at 7. 
8 Id. at 9. Central clearing more technically reduces counterparty credit risk, a type of 
counterparty risk that is sometimes called default risk. 
9 The reduction of counterparty risk might reduce systemic risk but cannot eliminate it because 
counterparty failure is not the only cause of systemic risk. Other factors, such as the failure of financial 
markets, can trigger systemic risk. Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 200-02 (2008). 
10 ”Systemic risk” refers generally to the risk that the financial system could fail to function as 
a network. Id. at 204, 207-08. The term “macroprudential regulation” refers to regulation designed 
to mitigate systemic risk. Cf. Douglas J. Elliott, Greg Feldberg & Andreas Lehnert, The History of 
Cyclical Macroprudential Policy in the United States 6 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Finance and Economics 
Discussion Series No. 2013-29, 2013) (observing that the goal of macroprudential regulation “is to 
manage factors that could endanger the financial system as a whole, even if they would not be 
obvious as serious threats when viewed in the context of any single institution”); Robert Hockett, 
Implementing Macroprudential Finance-Oversight Policy: Legal Considerations 4 (Jan. 20, 2013) 
(unpublished draft prepared for the International Monetary Fund) (available at https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2340316) (defining the term “macroprudential” as a “prefix [used] in finance-regulatory 
contexts, pertaining to the reduction of risks that imperil financial systems . . . as wholes”). In 
contrast, “microprudential” regulation “is concerned primarily with the safety and soundness of 
individual institutions, markets, or infrastructures.” Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors 
of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s 47th Annual Conference 
on Bank Structure and Competition: Implementing a Macroprudential Approach to Supervision 
and Regulation 2 (May 5, 2011) (transcript available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
speech/bernanke20110505a.pdf [https://perma.cc/E7P5-Y7CV]). 
11 The events that lead to that impairment are not limited to a domino-like collapse of financial 
institutions but could include changes in behavior of market participants in response to a 
counterparty’s failure. 
12 I first raised this question at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago workshop, Legal 
Arrangements for Cross-Border Resolution and Liquidity in OTC Derivative Markets: Theoretical 
Insights from “A Legal Theory of Finance” and Other Contemporary Perspectives, on June 14, 2014. 
13 Counterparty exposure is the amount of default risk to which a counterparty is subject. See, e.g., 
Counterparty Credit Exposure for Swaps, FINANCIALCAD CORP., http://www.fincad.com/resources/
resource-library/article/counterparty-credit-exposure-swaps [https://perma.cc/DFC4-8ZT7]. “Aggregate 
counterparty exposure” is the aggregate counterparty exposure after netting any offsetting counterparty 
obligations. The reader should not confuse that concept with the term “net aggregate liability,” which 
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financial contracts—and thus the systemic risk that could be triggered by that 
exposure—greatly exceeds that on derivatives contracts.14 Centrally clearing 
derivatives contracts through CCPs also has a “unique feature”: the 
“mutualization of default losses.”15 Expanding central clearing to 
nonderivative financial contracts therefore raises fundamental issues about 
whether regulators should require financial institutions to mutualize losses in 
order to control systemic risk.16 
To answer its question, this Article first shows that regulators require 
central clearing of derivatives contracts because they assume—driven in part 
by media pressure—that those contracts are inherently systemically risky.17 
This Article then explains why that assumption is misleading: the systemic 
riskiness of derivatives contracts comes not from their inherent nature but, 
rather, from their systemically important counterparties.18 Finally, this 
Article uses that insight to theorize and argue as to when regulation should 
require central clearing for nonderivative financial contracts.19 
 
refers to a CCP finding itself liable for an amount that it cannot set off against its clearing members. 
See infra notes 167, 171 and accompanying text. 
14 At yearend 2013, for example, the amount at risk (or “gross market value”) on outstanding 
bonds alone was $91 trillion. SIFMA RESEARCH DEP’T, SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, 2017 
FACT BOOK 55 (2017), http://www.lexissecuritiesmosaic.com/gateway/sec/public-statements/
10_US-Fact-Book-2017-SIFMA.pdf [https://perma.cc/9EER-KQZ5]. That amount is many times 
larger than the $19 trillion of risk exposure on derivatives. MONETARY & ECON. DEP’T, BANK FOR 
INT’L SETTLEMENTS, STATISTICAL RELEASE: OTC DERIVATIVE STATISTICS AT END-DECEMBER 
2013, at 2 (2014), https://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy1405.pdf [https://perma.cc/DR2K-6UJG]; cf. 
Supervisory Policy and Guidance Topics: Credit Risk Management, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. 
RESERVE SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/topics/credit_risk.htm [https://perma.cc/
6U7C-L282] (last updated Mar. 1, 2019) (“For most banks, loans are the largest and most obvious 
source of credit risk. However, there are other sources of credit risk both on and off the balance 
sheet [including] credit derivatives [and derivatives involving] foreign exchange . . . .”). This Article 
later explains why gross market value, and not “notional amount,” is the proper metric for comparing 
risk exposure. See infra note 105. 
15 Robert T. Cox & Robert S. Steigerwald, A CCP Is a CCP Is a CCP 1 (Fed. Reserve Bank of 
Chi., Working Paper No. PDP 2017-01, 2017). One reviewer of this Article called “the mutualisation 
of risk . . . one of the most important private ordering benefits of CCPs, one that is often 
overlook[ed].” Email Attachment from Paolo Saguato, Assistant Professor of Law, Antonin Scalia 
Law Sch., George Mason Univ., to author (Jan. 13, 2018, 8:51 PM) (on file with author). 
16 Mutualizing a risk of loss (and hence the resulting losses) refers to dividing it among 
multiple parties to reduce the chance that its occurrence will cause significant financial loss to any 
one party. See infra note 214 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 29–39 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 40–59 and accompanying text. 
19 Cf. Theory, OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY (1980) (defining “theory” as “a set of ideas 
formulated (by reasoning from known facts) to explain something”). 
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A. Terminology 
This analysis builds on the following foundational terminology. 
Consistent with financial industry shorthand, references to “clearing” also 
include settlement, and references to “central clearing” mean the clearing 
(and thus settlement) of contracts through CCPs. Central clearing of a 
nonderivative financial contract therefore means using a CCP to transmit, 
reconcile, and confirm each transfer to be made under the contract,20 and then 
to complete the transfer by paying funds or assigning securities as needed to 
satisfy counterparty obligations thereunder.21 The term “counterparty” 
means, depending on the context, either the contracting parties themselves 
or a CCP acting as a central counterparty. Applying these terms, central 
clearing of a loan agreement—which exemplifies a straightforward 
nonderivative financial contract—means using a CCP (acting as a central 
counterparty) to monitor the amount and dates of payments to be made 
thereunder and to make each such payment, when due, to the (counterparty) 
lender on behalf of the (counterparty) borrower.22 
References to a “financial contract” mean any contract—exemplified above 
by a loan agreement—that governs a financial or financing transaction.23 A 
derivatives contract is a specific type of financial contract: it is one that derives 
its value from the future performance of an underlying asset, index, or other 
reference entity.24 In that sense, it is a “bet” on that future underlying 
performance.25 For example, Party A may enter into a derivatives contract 
today to sell 1000 shares of XYZ stock, currently having a market value of $70 
per share, to Party B a year from now, at that same price. If in a year the market 
 
20 See supra note 1 and accompanying text (defining clearing of derivatives contracts). 
21 See supra note 2 and accompanying text (defining settlement of derivatives contracts). 
22 As discussed above, see supra text accompanying note 6, this reflects that the CCP legally 
substitutes its credit for that of the contracting parties, making the CCP the primary counterparty 
on both sides of the contract—in the case of loan agreements, the CCP serves as the lender to every 
borrower and the borrower to every lender. 
23 In principle, this Article addresses central clearing of any type of nonderivative financial 
contract. That includes not only loan agreements but also other standard types of financial contracts, 
such as bond indentures, commercial paper agreements, repo agreements, guarantees, and standby 
letters of credit, and perhaps even other types of contracts that allocate monetary risk such as 
insurance. Mutualizing insurance risk through CCPs, for example, might have the potential to 
replace state guarantee funds or even to reduce the need for reinsurance, which creates its own major 
risks. See Daniel Schwarcz & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk in Insurance, 81 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1569, 1613-18 (2014) (discussing the risks of the opaque reinsurance industry). 
24 Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS. L. 
REV. 1, 6 (2011). 
25 See id. (observing that derivatives contracts are “bets,” being “agreements between parties 
that one will pay the other a sum of money that is determined by whether or not a particular event 
occurs in the future”). 
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value of XYZ stock has fallen to $50 per share, Party A would benefit.26 But if 
that market value had instead risen to $80 per share, Party B would benefit.27 
B. Historical Context 
The move to require central clearing of derivatives contracts assumes that 
derivatives contracts are unusually systemically risky and, indeed, were a cause 
of the financial crisis.28 The media portrayed American International Group 
(AIG)—which was potentially liable under multiple credit-default swaps 
(CDS), a type of derivatives contract,29 to investors in mortgage-backed 
 
26 Party A could, for example, purchase the 1000 shares at $50 per share and immediately resell 
them to Party B at the agreed-upon $70 per share, making a $20 per share profit. Or the parties could 
settle the contract by the simple payment of that net amount by Party B to Party A. 
27 In a parallel to the previous scenario, Party B could purchase the 1000 shares from A at $70 
per share and immediately resell them at $80, making a $10 per-share profit, or the parties could 
settle the contract by having Party A pay the net amount to Party B. 
28 See, e.g., ERNST & YOUNG, DODD-FRANK’S TITLE VII – OTC DERIVATIVES REFORM 1 (2013), 
https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Key_questions_board_members_should_ask_about_Title_
VII/$FILE/Americas_FAAS_Dodd_Frank_derivatives_reform.pdf [https://perma.cc/NV54-ZDJS] 
(“Congress viewed the lack of regulation of OTC derivatives transactions as exacerbating the 2008 
financial crisis . . . [s]ince the trades were not regulated, the amount of market participants’ exposures 
throughout the financial system could not be quantified . . . . Title VII aims to reduce systemic risk 
through mandating central clearing of previously unregulated derivative instruments . . . .”). To some 
extent also, the move to require central clearing of derivatives contracts might indirectly respond to 
certain precrisis publicized losses on derivatives contracts, such as the highly publicized losses incurred 
by Orange County, California, and Gibson Greetings. Cf. Dan Awrey, Toward a Supply-Side Theory of 
Financial Innovation, 41 J. COMP. ECON. 401, 406 (2013) (observing that “a series of high profile 
derivatives-related scandals involving market participants such as Orange County [and] Gibson 
Greetings” prompted the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) to issue “a Concept 
Release in May 1998 announcing its intention to fundamentally re-examine its approach toward the 
regulation of OTC derivatives markets . . . as part of a comprehensive reform effort designed to update 
the CFTC’s oversight of both exchange-traded and OTC derivatives markets” and seeking “comment 
on a number of specific areas of potential reform including” clearing). 
29 To understand a CDS, a special type of derivatives contract sometimes called a “credit 
derivative,” consider the example of Party A making a loan to Party B. If Party A is concerned about 
Party B’s ability to repay the loan, Party A (in this capacity, the protection buyer) may enter into a CDS 
contract with Party C (the protection seller) under which Party C agrees to make any payments that 
Party B fails to make. In exchange for this protection, Party A pays Party C a fee. See, e.g., Understanding 
Investing: Credit Default Swaps, PACIFIC INV. MGMT. CO., LLC, https://www.pimco.com/en-us/
resources/education/understanding-credit-default-swaps [https://perma.cc/934H-ZLRZ]. Protection 
sellers may enter into many CDS contracts, thereby earning fee income while helping market 
participants to hedge risk. Although documented as a derivatives contract on International Swaps 
and Derivatives Association (ISDA) forms, a CDS contract is fundamentally a guarantee. Cf. 
Leonard Ng, Credit Default Swaps, Guarantees and Insurance Policies: Same Effect, Different Treatment?, 
2010 BUTTERWORTHS J. INT’L BANKING & FIN. L. 664, 664-66 (observing that U.K. financial and 
insurance law treats CDS contracts and guarantees similarly in many important respects, in sharp 
contrast with how it treats “insurance contracts” with which they are sometimes confused). 
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securities (MBS)30—as a “poster child” for that crisis.31 The collapse of the 
MBS market threatened AIG’s financial integrity as panicking investors 
commenced collection actions on their CDS contracts.32 Observers believe 
that, absent its government bailout, AIG would have collapsed and caused 
massive systemic harm.33 Although his statement is often taken out of context, 
Warren Buffet added fuel to the fire by famously referring to derivatives 
contracts as “financial weapons of mass destruction.”34 
 
30 See Christoph Henkel, Harmonizing European Union Bank Resolution: Central Clearing of OTC 
Derivative Contracts Maintaining the Status Quo of Safe Harbors, 22 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 81, 97-98 (2013) (explaining that AIG was “unable to post sufficient collateral to ensure 
meeting its obligations under the majority of its CDS agreements,” leading to “a run on its collateral 
by its derivative counterparties and CDS protection buyers”); Stephen J. Lubben, Repeal the Safe 
Harbors, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 319, 320 (2010) (describing the AIG collapse as a “downward 
spiral”). At least some of those “investors” may not actually have owned MBS; instead, they directly 
or indirectly purchased protection under CDS contracts whose payments tied to MBS pricing. 
31 See, e.g., Michael S. Barr & Joe Valenti, Commentary: How the CFPB Fight Is a Sign of the Next Financial 
Crisis, FORTUNE (Dec. 6, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/12/06/cfpb-director-mick-mulvaney-leandra-english 
[https://perma.cc/V6UG-L25Y] (referring to AIG as the “poster child of the financial crisis”). 
32 See Lubben, supra note 30, at 320. Ironically, the safe harbor provisions of U.S. bankruptcy 
law appear to have exacerbated AIG’s position by allowing counterparty suits to go forward 
notwithstanding the automatic stay, which suspends all litigation against an entity that has filed for 
bankruptcy. Id. These provisions give derivatives-contract counterparties “virtually unlimited 
enforcement rights against [a counterparty] debtor.” Steven L. Schwarcz, Derivatives and Collateral: 
Balancing Remedies and Systemic Risk, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 699, 700. This deprives a systemically 
important counterparty debtor of bankruptcy law’s protections, including the automatic stay, 
“thereby hastening [its] collapse.” Id. at 707. For that reason, I have argued that “the safe harbor’s 
application should be limited to remedies pursued by SIFIs against non-SIFIs.” See id. at 712, 718 
(using the term “SIFI,” as is common, to refer to a systemically important financial institution). 
33 See Felix Salmon, Why AIG Wasn’t Allowed to Fail, REUTERS (Mar. 17, 2009), 
http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/03/17/why-aig-wasnt-allowed-to-fail [https://perma.cc/
N6DW-2GKP] (explaining that the government bailed out AIG as a result of the “systemic fragility 
of the CDS market” in order to prevent “a cascade of counterparty failures which could kill the 
entire financial system”). 
34 Letter from Warren E. Buffet, Chairman, Berkshire Hathaway Inc., to Shareholders of 
Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 15 (Feb. 21, 2003) (available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/
2002pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/L58B-PX84]). The media has also suggested that Lehman Brothers’ 
derivatives contracts were unusually systemically risky. See, e.g., Jeffrey McCracken, Lehman’s Chaotic 
Bankruptcy Filing Destroyed Billions in Value, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 29, 2008, 12:01 AM ET), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123050916770038267 (reporting that the early termination of 
Lehman Brothers’ derivatives contracts is estimated to have cost the firm approximately fifty billion 
dollars). Ironically, as in AIG, this cost instead resulted from the safe harbor provisions of U.S. 
bankruptcy law purporting to protect derivatives counterparties. Cf. Too Big to Fail: The Role for 
Bankruptcy and Antitrust Law in Financial Regulation Reform (Part I): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Commercial & Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 71-72 (2009) (statement of 
Harvey R. Miller, Lead Counsel for Lehman Brothers’ Bankruptcy, Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP) 
(testifying that Lehman’s lack of automatic stay protection in bankruptcy, due to those safe harbor 
provisions, led to a state of confusion and chaos); Lubben, supra note 30, at 320 (observing that those 
safe harbor provisions exacerbated AIG’s position by allowing counterparty suits to go forward 
notwithstanding the automatic stay). 
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In response, the Dodd-Frank Act—the Congressional legislation that seeks 
to redress the excesses that led to the financial crisis35—and followup regulation 
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and CFTC require that 
many derivatives contracts be centrally cleared through CCPs.36 In accord with 
recommendations of the Financial Stability Board, an organization established 
by the G20 nations to monitor and make recommendations about the global 
financial system, numerous jurisdictions outside the United States have 
similarly begun requiring central clearing of derivatives contracts.37 If AIG’s 
CDS contracts were centrally cleared, the argument goes, it would not have 
needed a government bailout.38 
In the first instance, the answer to this Article’s question—whether 
regulators should also require nonderivative financial contracts to be centrally 
cleared—turns on understanding why derivatives contracts are systemically 
risky. If derivatives contracts are inherently systemically riskier than 
nonderivative financial contracts, then centrally clearing nonderivative 
financial contracts might only marginally reduce systemic risk. If, however, 
derivatives contracts are systemically risky because of a trait they share with 
nonderivative financial contracts, then it could be valuable to extend central 
clearing to nonderivative financial contracts that share that trait. 
This Article’s analysis proceeds as follows. Part I examines the systemic 
riskiness of financial contracts. It finds that derivatives contracts are not 
inherently systemically risky; rather, their systemic riskiness derives from their 
systemically important counterparties. Observing that nonderivative financial 
contracts sometimes also have systemically important counterparties, Part I then 
builds on that shared trait to derive a theory to explain when regulation should 
require central clearing of nonderivative financial contracts. Part II develops the 
theory by testing it against current regulation requiring the central clearing of 
derivatives contracts. Part III examines the theory’s regulatory and economic 
efficiency implications for determining whether to expand central clearing to 
 
35 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010). 
36 Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act sets forth general requirements for derivatives, 
subsequently expanded through SEC and CFTC regulation. See, e.g., Derivatives, U.S. SEC. & 
EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/derivatives.shtml [https://perma.cc/
6J52-XYRC] (last updated May 4, 2015). 
37 See, e.g., RICHARD HECKINGER, IVANA RUFFINI & KIRSTIN WELLS, FED. RESERVE 
BANK OF CHI., UNDERSTANDING DERIVATIVES: MARKETS AND INFRASTRUCTURE 32 (2014), 
https://www.chicagofed.org/~/media/publications/understanding-derivatives/understanding-derivatives-
chapter-3-over-the-counter-derivatives-pdf.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/Z5DY-8YUF] (summarizing the 
regulatory history of the central clearing mandate for derivatives contracts). 
38 Cf. supra notes 29–33 and accompanying text (discussing AIG’s near failure). As this Article 
will explain, however, that begs the question whether the CCP would have needed a government 
bailout. See infra Part IV. 
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nonderivative financial contracts. It also identifies and balances the benefits and 
costs of such a regulatory expansion. Part IV examines how to limit the costs of 
expansion, including by adapting the protections against CCP risk concentration 
that currently apply to central clearing of derivatives contracts. It also examines 
how to enhance those protections. Part V focuses in depth on two fundamental 
legal questions raised by central clearing: whether regulators should mandate how 
financial institutions control risk, and whether they should require financial 
institutions to mutualize risk. Appendix 1 to this Article illustrates how 
nonderivative financial contracts could be centrally cleared and compares that to 
the central clearing of derivatives contracts. Finally, Appendix 2 explains how to 
standardize nonderivative financial contracts, showing that such standardization 
would be quite feasible because, among other reasons, nonderivative financial 
contracts already are commonly documented on standardized forms. 
I. EXAMINING THE SYSTEMIC RISKINESS OF FINANCIAL CONTRACTS 
As discussed, regulators assume that derivatives contracts are inherently 
systemically risky, suggesting that something about their nature creates that 
risk. That assumption, however, has never been rigorously tested. Section I.A 
examines the nature of derivatives contracts to explain their systemic 
riskiness. Thereafter, Section I.B uses insights from that inquiry to explain 
the potential systemic riskiness of nonderivative financial contracts. 
A. Explaining Why Derivatives Contracts Are Systemically Risky 
There are almost no formal studies of the inherent systemic riskiness of 
derivatives contracts,39 much less studies comparing the systemic riskiness of 
derivatives and nonderivative financial contracts. Most of the discussion has 
been anecdotal. Some argue, for example, that derivatives contracts are 
especially systemically risky because derivatives are bets.40 However, all 
financial contracts are bets. A loan agreement is a bet by a lender that the 
borrower will repay the loan on a timely basis with interest. Even a simple 
guarantee is a bet by the guarantor, in consideration of a guarantee fee, that 
the guaranteed obligation will not default. 
Others suggest that derivatives contracts are especially systemically risky 
because derivatives are volatile: “[u]nlike other contracts, the value of 
[derivatives contracts] typically can change rapidly based on the fluctuating 
 
39 Compare studies cited infra notes 57–58 (supporting this Article’s explanation of why derivatives 
contracts are systemically risky), with Yesha Yadav, The Problematic Case of Clearinghouses in Complex 
Markets, 101 GEO. L.J. 387, 391 (2013) (discussing the inherent riskiness of credit-derivatives contracts, 
a special type of derivatives contract). 
40 Cf. supra note 25 and accompanying text (characterizing derivatives contracts as bets). 
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value of the underlying assets or collateral, prevailing market conditions and 
other factors.”41 Volatility in turn can create the possibility of indeterminate 
liability. Consider, for example, an interest-rate swap in which Party A 
exchanges its fixed interest-rate payments for Party B’s floating rate payments 
(based, for example, on LIBOR). If interest rates fall, Party B will take a loss 
that cannot be precisely quantified ex ante because it will depend on the 
magnitude of the interest-rate change. 
Nonetheless, the parties usually can estimate the limits of their potential 
liability.42 In the interest-rate swap example, there is indeterminate liability 
insofar as the parties cannot know, when they enter into the derivatives 
contract, the sign (positive or negative) and magnitude of the interest-rate 
change. In reality, however, they will know from market experience and be able 
to model the likely maximum range of any interest-rate change within the 
timeframe of their contractual settlement date.43 Similarly, in the example of 
Party A contracting to sell 1000 shares of XYZ stock to Party B a year hence at 
$70 per share (its current market value),44 there is indeterminate liability insofar 
as the parties cannot currently know the sign and magnitude of XYZ stock’s 
change in market value. In reality, again, they will know from market 
experience and be able to calculate the likely maximum range of any such 
change within the next year.45 Furthermore, the derivatives contracts that some 
have identified as the most dangerous type—credit derivatives46—actually have 
fairly precisely known maximum liabilities: in the case of a CDS guaranteeing 
repayment of a loan, for example, the maximum liability would be the principal 
and interest accruing on the loan through the settlement date.47 
 
41 Exploring Chapter 11 Reform: Corporate and Financial Institution Insolvencies; Treatment of 
Derivatives: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial & Antitrust Law of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 40 (2014) (statement of Seth Grosshandler, Partner, Cleary 
Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP). 
42 See René M. Stulz, Should We Fear Derivatives?, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2004, at 173, 186 
(observing that, “[s]ince 1994, regular users of derivatives have made considerable progress in measuring 
the risks of derivatives portfolios [and w]ith these tools, firms that use derivatives regularly know their 
risks reasonably well,” but cautioning that “these measurement tools do not always work well”). 
43 See, e.g., PAUL G. FERRARA & SEYED ALI NEZZAMODDINI, INTEREST RATE SWAPS—AN 
EXPOSURE ANALYSIS 26 (2013) (discussing how parties estimate their likely exposure to interest-rate 
change within the timeframe of their contractual settlement date). 
44 See supra text accompanying notes 25–27. 
45 Cf. infra note 52 and accompanying text (observing that accountants have devised a range of 
methodologies to estimate potential liability for even the most complex derivatives). 
46 See Yadav, supra note 39, at 391; see also supra note 29 and accompanying text (explaining 
credit derivatives). 
47 Cf. PRUDENTIAL FIN., INC., PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL, INC. 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 206 
(2015), http://www3.prudential.com/annualreport/report2015/annual/images/Prudential-AR2014.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X6TL-Y2NT] (“The Company’s maximum amount at risk under [its] credit 
derivatives equals the aforementioned notional amounts [i.e., principal and interest on the underlying 
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Although the foregoing interest-rate swap and CDS examples (which 
reflect some of the most common types of derivatives contracts) are relatively 
simple, parties usually can estimate the limits of their potential liability even 
under much more complex derivatives. The disclosure of this liability is in 
fact an accounting requirement. Government securities regulators48 have 
delegated to the accounting profession49 the duty to disclose financial 
information—including information about the fair value of derivatives as 
either assets or liabilities50—through formalized financial statements, such as 
balance sheets and income statements; the goal is to provide the “credib[ility], 
transparen[cy], and comparab[ility]” needed for “the efficient functioning of 
the economy.”51 To facilitate that required disclosure about derivatives 
liability, accountants have devised a range of methodologies to estimate 
potential liability for even the most complex derivatives.52 
 
obligations on which Prudential sold credit protection] and assumes the value of the underlying 
referenced securities [i.e., their principal and interest payable thereunder] become [sic] worthless.”). 
48 In the United States, the Securities and Exchange Commission. See Steven L. Schwarcz, 
Private Ordering, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 319, 320, 346-47 (2002) (discussing the SEC’s delegation of 
disclosure power to the accounting profession). 
49 In the United States, to the Financial Accounting Standards Board, or FASB. Id. 
50 In the United States, this is governed by Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) No. 133, 
which “establishes accounting and reporting standards for derivative instruments” and “requires that 
an entity recognize all derivatives as either assets or liabilities in the statement of financial position 
and measure those instruments at fair value.” See Summary of Statement No. 133: Accounting for 
Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities (Issued 6/98), FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., 
http://www.fasb.org/st/summary/stsum133.shtml [https://perma.cc/ME5H-HCVQ]. FAS 133 has 
been amended by FAS 161, which requires even further enhanced derivatives disclosure. See Statement 
of Financial Accounting Standards No. 161: Disclosures About Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities, 
FIN. ACCT. SERIES (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., Norwalk, Conn.), Mar. 2008, at 1. 
51 FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., FACTS ABOUT FASB 1 (2007), https://www.fasb.org/
cs/BlobServer?blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobkey=id&blobwhere=1175818791156&
blobheader=application%2Fpdf [https://perma.cc/4AX6-TZ7W]. 
52 See, e.g., ERNST & YOUNG, CREDIT VALUATION ADJUSTMENT FOR DERIVATIVES 
CONTRACTS 5-6 (2014), https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-credit-valuation-adjustments-
for-derivative-contracts/$FILE/EY-Applying-FV-April-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/S8CK-LQSH]. 
This publication discusses various approaches for calculating valuation adjustments to value 
derivatives contracts fairly—fair value meaning in this context, as defined by International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) 13, “the price that would be . . . paid to transfer a liability in an orderly 
transaction between market participants at the measurement date.” IFRS 13 Fair Value Measurement, 
INT’L FIN. REPORTING STANDARDS, https://www.ifrs.org/issued-standards/list-of-standards/
ifrs-13-fair-value-measurement [https://perma.cc/V63G-9T6L]. The Deloitte accounting firm 
defines fair value under IFRS 13 more intuitively as “how much the reporting entity has to pay to a 
market participant such that the market participant is willing to take over the liability.” DELOITTE 
LLP, CLEARLY IFRS—SUMMARY GUIDANCE AND PRACTICAL TIPS FOR IFRS 13 – FAIR VALUE 
MEASUREMENT 1 (2014), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/ca/Documents/audit/
ca-en-audit-clearly-ifrs-fair-value-measurement-ifrs-13.pdf [https://perma.cc/NJC9-XUAK]. The “most 
advanced approach” is the Expected Future Exposure (EFE) approach, which is used by banks and other 
financial institutions with large derivative portfolios and can be “used for many types of derivatives.” 
ERNST & YOUNG, supra, at 5-6. Because the EFE approach “can be very complex and . . . needs to be 
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For these reasons, volatility alone does not make derivatives contracts 
systemically riskier than nonderivative financial contracts. That leaves only 
one other factor that can explain the systemic riskiness of derivatives contracts: 
most such contracts have at least one large53 and highly interconnected54 
financial institution as a counterparty. The three main determinants of 
systemic risk are size, interconnectedness, and substitutability.55 Having a 
large and highly interconnected financial institution as a counterparty 
(hereinafter, a “systemically important counterparty”) causes derivatives 
contracts to incorporate two of those three determinants of systemic risk.56 
The little research examining why derivatives contracts are systemically 
risky supports the view that their riskiness turns on the systemically 
important nature of their counterparties. Economists at the New York Federal 
Reserve Bank and finance scholars at Yale find, for example, that derivatives 
“create[] systemic risk” when the failure of a derivatives counterparty “could 
seriously impair the financial condition of one or more of its [systemically 
important] counterparties.”57 No research appears to contradict that finding.58 
 
executed by quantitative experts and requires access to significant IT systems,” many firms “have adopted 
alternative approaches for estimating” liability on their derivatives contracts. Id. 
53 Cf. Franklin R. Edwards & Edward R. Morrison, Derivatives and Systemic Risk: What Role 
Can the Bankruptcy Code Play? (finding that relatively few banks effectively control the derivatives 
market, and that seven U.S. banks hold more than ninety-five percent of the U.S. notional 
derivatives exposure), in SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL CRISES: RESOLVING LARGE BANK INSOLVENCIES 
347, 351 (Douglas D. Evanoff & George G. Kaufman eds., 2005). 
54 See, e.g., Christopher S. Dwight, Note, Missed (Inter)Connections: Proposed Revisions to the 
Federal Reserve’s Approach to Financial Stability Analysis Under the Bank Holding Company Act, 18 N.C. 
BANKING INST. 599, 603 (2014) (arguing that derivatives counterparties are highly interconnected 
because they engage in multiple transactions with other systemically important firms). 
55 See Schwarcz, supra note 32, at 704. 
56 Cf. James Bullard, President & Chief Executive Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 
Systemic Risk and the Macroeconomy: An Attempt at Perspective (Oct. 2, 2008) (transcript 
available at https://www.stlouisfed.org/from-the-president/speeches-and-presentations/2008/
systemic-risk-and-the-macroeconomy-an-attempt-at-perspective [https://perma.cc/JDD3-RJBM]) 
(arguing that the failure of a large and highly interconnected counterparty can lead to a domino 
effect, setting off a pattern of failures among its counterparties). But cf. Rizwaan Jameel Mokal, 
Liquidity, Systemic Risk, and the Bankruptcy Treatment of Financial Contracts, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. 
& COM. L. 15, 15-16 (2015) (arguing that counterparty failure may not be a significant source of 
systemic risk, and that the “domino contagion view of distress . . . is theoretically flawed and 
empirically false” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Professor Mokal contends that the premise 
of the domino-effect risk, that “a significant market participant’s failure to meet its obligations would 
result in similar failures by its counterparties,” is a “relic of the [flawed] microprudential 
understanding of systemic risk”; among other hurdles, he maintains, a domino-effect collapse would 
require an implausibly large initial failure. Id. at 19. 
57 ROSALIND Z. WIGGINS & ANDREW METRICK, YALE SCH. OF MGMT., THE LEHMAN 
BROTHERS BANKRUPTCY G: THE SPECIAL CASE OF DERIVATIVES 15-16 (2014) (quoting with 
approval a New York Federal Reserve study). 
58 Although one study suggests that the “complexity and limited transparency of the [over-the-counter 
derivatives] market reinforced the potential for excessive risk-taking” and thus counterparty failure. See 
DARRELL DUFFIE, ADA LI & THEO LUBKE, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT NO. 424, 
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B. Explaining Why Nonderivative Financial Contracts  
Could Be Systemically Risky 
The insight that the systemic riskiness of derivatives contracts turns on the 
nature of their counterparties, not on their inherent nature, indicates that 
nonderivative financial contracts with systemically important counterparties 
could also be systemically risky.59 That presumes, of course, that the 
systemically important counterparty is exposed to counterparty risk.60 That 
presumption should be valid because virtually all financial contracts—whether 
derivatives or nonderivatives—create counterparty risk, which results from the 
performance of obligations over time.61 Financial contracts depend on future 
performance.62 Even the simplest loan agreement, for example, depends on 
the borrower being able to repay principal and interest in the future.63 
Indeed, much of the financial institution counterparty risk that triggered the 
financial crisis arose under nonderivative financial contracts. Although some 
identify Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy as a cause of the financial crisis,64 
Lehman’s counterparty risk first arose under MBS contracts, which are 
nonderivative financial contracts.65 Lehman’s counterparties began demanding 
 
POLICY PERSPECTIVES ON OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET INFRASTRUCTURE 1 (2010) (suggesting that 
excessive risk taking by financial firms has a wide range of causes); infra note 145 and accompanying text. 
Moreover, over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives contracts are not always centrally cleared. 
59 Incongruously, the Dodd-Frank requirement to centrally clear derivatives contracts through 
CCPs applies whether or not a derivatives contract has any systemically important counterparties. 
60 Cf. NORMAN, supra note 6, at 7 (defining counterparty risk); supra note 8 and accompanying 
text (same). 
61 Cf. Law and Finance Workshop, FED. RESERVE BANK OF CHI., https://www.chicagofed.org/
events/2014/law-finance-workshop [https://perma.cc/ZGN8-TSUA] (last updated June 10, 2014) 
(stating that it “is the performance of obligations over time . . . which introduces the liquidity and 
counterparty credit risks at the heart of the contemporary policy debate surrounding the regulation 
of [derivatives] markets”). 
62 The exceptions are very limited, such as a “spot” contract, a subset of derivatives contracts in 
which the contract performance is immediate—such as a traveler exchanging U.S. dollars for euros at an 
airport at the then-posted exchange rate. See, e.g., Spot Contracts – What Are They?, TRADE FIN. GLOB., 
https://www.tradefinanceglobal.com/currency/spot-contracts [https://perma.cc/L2BG-CPDY]. 
63 See supra text following note 40. One reviewer of this Article asked whether the fact that 
nonderivative financial contracts create “one-sided counterparty credit risk, while most derivatives 
present two-sided risk” might make derivatives contracts systemically riskier. It should not for at least 
two reasons. First, relatively more counterparties to derivatives contracts are systemically important, 
see infra note 75, so the likelihood any counterparty defaults is less than for nonsystemically important 
counterparties. Second, nonderivative financial contracts also effectively have two-sided risk. This 
Article focuses on the risk that a counterparty borrower defaults in repaying a systemically important 
counterparty lender, causing it to fail; but the counterparty borrower also bears the risk that its 
financial condition will deteriorate during the loan term, causing it to default. 
64 See, e.g., Viral Acharya et al., The Financial Crisis of 2007-2009: Causes and Remedies, 18 FIN. 
MKTS. INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS 89, 93 (2009) (stating that Lehman’s bankruptcy “led to 
the near collapse of the financial system”). 
65 MBS are promissory notes backed by interests in mortgage loans. See, e.g., U.S. Bank Nat’l 
Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 51 (Mass. 2011) (stating that “mortgage loans are pooled together in 
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collateral out of concern that the collapse of the MBS market was causing 
Lehman’s large MBS investments to become worthless.66 Although Lehman 
filed for bankruptcy protection in response to those demands, the problems with 
Lehman’s derivatives contracts arose only once Lehman went into bankruptcy.67 
Similarly, although the move to require central clearing of derivatives 
contracts assumes those contracts were a cause of the financial crisis,68 
derivatives-contract problems were more of an effect than a cause. CDS 
investors commenced collection actions against AIG because of the collapse 
of the MBS market.69 They would not have done so absent that collapse 
because AIG would have been able to pay its liability on the CDS. 
Observers also identify the failure of the repo market as a cause of the 
financial crisis.70 Repos are nonderivative financial contracts—short-term 
secured loans couched as sales and repurchases of securities that serve as the 
collateral for the loan,71 not unlike a conditional sale agreement.72 Because the 
amount of the repo market is huge, scholars are beginning to argue for the 
central clearing of repo transactions.73 
Informed by these observations, this Article’s question can be restated 
more precisely: should regulators require nonderivative financial contracts that 
have at least one systemically important counterparty to be centrally cleared in order 
 
a trust and converted into mortgage-backed securities, the underlying promissory notes serve as 
financial instruments generating a potential income stream for investors”). Normally, derivatives 
have nothing to do with MBS. See, e.g., FIRST EMPIRE SEC., MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES 4, 
http://www.1empire.com/Forms/MBS.pdf [https://perma.cc/63SV-M8FR] (stating that “it is 
important to understand the MBSs are not mortgage derivative investments”). 
66 See Laurence Ball, The Fed and Lehman Brothers: Introduction and Summary 7-8 (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22410, 2016), https://www.nber.org/papers/w22410 
[https://perma.cc/VCA6-AZS7] (observing that collateral calls by counterparties, including 
demands for collateral from JP Morgan Chase, the clearing bank for Lehman’s tri-party repos, 
contributed to Lehman’s collapse); cf. infra note 82 and accompanying text (discussing how the fear 
of counterparty risk could lead to a systemically important firm’s failure). 
67 Cf. McCracken, supra note 34 (explaining why Lehman’s derivatives problems resulted from 
its bankruptcy). 
68 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
69 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
70 See, e.g., Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo, 104 J. 
FIN. ECON. 425, 425 (2012). 
71 See, e.g., 1. What Is a Repo?, INT’L CAPITAL MKT. ASS’N, https://www.icmagroup.org/
Regulatory-Policy-and-Market-Practice/repo-and-collateral-markets/icma-ercc-publications/frequently-
asked-questions-on-repo/1-what-is-a-repo [https://perma.cc/VHQ7-U4UY]. 
72 See U.C.C. § 1-201(35) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977) (observing that the 
“retention or reservation of title by a seller of goods [i.e., a conditional sale agreement] is limited in 
effect to a reservation of a ‘security interest’”). 
73 See, e.g., Paolo Saguato, The Liquidity Dilemma and the Repo Market: A Two-Step Policy Option 
to Address the Regulatory Void, 22 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 85, 126 (2017) (arguing that CCPs should 
be used to reduce risk in the repo markets). Repo dealers already voluntarily engage in a form of 
central clearing. See infra notes 177–79 and accompanying text. 
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to reduce systemic risk?74 Consistent with this restatement, further references 
in this Article to nonderivative financial contracts shall mean only such 
contracts that have at least one systemically important counterparty.75 
The restated question can also be reformulated as an initial theory76: to 
reduce systemic risk, regulators should require central clearing of 
nonderivative financial contracts that have at least one systemically important 
counterparty. That theory is incomplete, however, because financial regulation 
is justified only if its benefits exceed its costs.77 Although requiring central 
clearing of nonderivative financial contracts will create benefits by reducing 
systemic risk resulting from individual counterparty risk, it can also create 
costs, notably the transaction costs of creating and operating the CCPs and 
 
74 This Article does not need to differentiate at the outset whether the systemically important 
counterparty is an obligor or an obligee. Using the preceding example of a loan agreement, see supra 
notes 21–22 and accompanying text, if the systemically important counterparty is a lender (an 
obligee), the failure of the borrower (an obligor) to repay the loan may cause the lender’s failure; 
whereas if the systemically important counterparty is a borrower (an obligor), its repayment 
exposure might cause its failure especially if that exposure is aggregated on multiple loans—such as 
might occur for a highly leveraged firm. Cf. supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing AIG’s 
precrisis aggregated counterparty exposure on CDS contracts). 
75 Because derivatives markets are relatively concentrated, see Schwarcz, supra note 32, at 706, 
a derivatives contract may be more likely than a nonderivative financial contract to have not just one 
but two systemically important counterparties. If systemic riskiness were to turn on the contract 
having at least two systemically important counterparties, this Article’s analysis of expanding central 
clearing to nonderivative financial contracts should be limited to financial contracts that have at least 
two such counterparties. Analytically though, a financial contract that has just one systemically 
important counterparty can be systemically risky. Indeed, a financial contract that has two parties, 
both of whom are systemically important, may be less systemically risky than a financial contract 
that has just one systemically important counterparty. Both parties to the former contract, being 
systemically important, would be legally required to maintain capital and other protections that 
minimize their likely failure. Therefore, neither would likely default under the contract. The 
nonsystemically important counterparty to the latter contract would thus be more likely to default, 
which could destabilize that contract’s systemically important counterparty. 
76 Again, this Article uses the term “theory” in its fundamental meaning as a set of ideas that 
help to explain something. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (quoting the Oxford American 
Dictionary’s definition of theory as “a set of ideas formulated (by reasoning from known facts) to 
explain something”). 
77 See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Benefit-Cost Paradigms in Financial Regulation, 43 J. 
LEGAL STUD. (SPECIAL ISSUE) S1, S3 (2014) (arguing that financial regulation should be subject to 
cost-benefit analysis); Cass R. Sunstein, Financial Regulation and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 124 YALE 
L.J.F. 263, 263 (2015) (explaining that “[c]ost-benefit analysis is best understood as a way for agencies 
to ensure that their decisions are informed”); cf. Cost-Benefit Analysis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(10th ed. 2014) (defining cost–benefit analysis as “[a]n analytical technique that weighs the costs of 
a proposed decision”); Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA), BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY (Stephen Michael 
Sheppard ed., Wolters Kluwer Compact ed. 2011) (observing that federal agency cost–benefit 
analysis for determining whether a new regulation is promulgated “must demonstrate that the 
benefits to society outweigh the costs that the regulation will impose”). 
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the possible systemic costs of concentrating counterparty risk in the CCPs.78 
A complete theory should take into account those benefits and costs.79 
To help develop this theory, this Article next tests it against current 
regulation requiring the central clearing of derivatives contracts. 
II. CENTRAL CLEARING OF DERIVATIVES CONTRACTS 
As discussed, the United States and many other nations now require 
counterparties to centrally clear most of their derivatives contracts through 
CCPs.80 In principle, this makes sense as a way to reduce systemic risk if, as 
is often the case, the derivatives contract has at least one systemically 
important counterparty.81 Counterparty risk that causes the failure—or even 
the fear of failure—of systemically important counterparties can trigger 
 
78 See, e.g., VIKTORIA BAKLANOVA, OCEAN DALTON & STATHIS TOMPAIDIS, OFFICE OF 
FIN. RESEARCH, BRIEF SERIES NO. 17-04, BENEFITS AND RISKS OF CENTRAL CLEARING IN THE 
REPO MARKET 1-5 (2017) (discussing those costs); cf. Ivana Ruffini, Central Clearing: Risks and 
Customer Protections, 39 ECON. PERSP. 90, 97 (2015) (observing that central clearing creates systemic 
costs by concentrating counterparty risk in the CCPs); infra note 91 and accompanying text (same). 
79 Compare infra note 86 and accompanying text (observing the Dodd-Frank Act’s mandate that 
reducing systemic risk is so urgent that regulation reducing that risk should not be conditioned on a 
cost–benefit analysis), with PAUL ROSE & CHRISTOPHER J. WALKER, THE IMPORTANCE OF COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN FINANCIAL REGULATION 2 (2013), https://www.centerforcapitalmarkets.com/
wp-content/uploads/2013/08/CBA-Report-3.10.131.pdf [https://perma.cc/LYM9-JH7S] (arguing, in 
response to the failure to adequately conduct cost–benefit analysis in financial regulation pursuant 
to the Dodd-Frank Act, that the history and policies that motivate the use of cost–benefit analysis 
“generally apply with equal (if not greater) force in the financial regulation context” and that 
“[f]inancial regulators, especially in the context of Dodd-Frank, can and should ground their 
rulemaking in robust cost-benefit analysis in order to arrive at more rational decision-making and 
efficient regulatory action as well as to promote good governance and democratic accountability”). 
This Article’s analysis is normative, so it does not purport to rely on the Dodd-Frank Act’s aforesaid 
mandate. Moreover, federal regulators’ decision to backtrack on designating insurer MetLife as a 
SIFI—after initially imposing that designation under the authority of the Dodd-Frank Act—mounted 
an implied challenge to that law’s mandate. See, e.g., John Heltman, FSOC Gives Up Effort to Designate 
MetLife as SIFI, AM. BANKER (Jan. 18, 2018, 9:45 PM EST), https://www.americanbanker.com/
news/fsoc-gives-up-effort-to-designate-metlife-as-sifi. 
80 See supra notes 28–38 and accompanying text (explaining also that this central clearing 
requirement is largely a response to the financial crisis, in which counterparty risk in derivatives 
contracts played out in dramatic fashion). 
81 Adam J. Levitin, Response: The Tenuous Case for Derivatives Clearinghouses, 101 GEO. L.J. 445, 452-53 
(2013). CCPs may also add value as central information aggregators. Cf. R.A. Washington, Derivatives: What 
Is a Clearinghouse?, ECONOMIST (Apr. 22, 2010), http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2010/04/
derivatives [https://perma.cc/A6VU-ZZTN] (explaining that “[c]learinghouses also centralize trade 
reporting, and can provide any level of post-trade transparency to the OTC derivatives markets that your 
heart desires—same-day trade reporting, including prices, aggregate and counterparty-level position data, 
etc.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Economics of Contempt, Exchanges vs. Clearinghouses (This 
is Important), ECON. OF CONTEMPT (Apr. 14, 2010, 4:36 PM), http://economicsofcontempt.blogspot.com/
2010/04/exchanges-vs-clearinghouses-this-is.html [https://perma.cc/W8ZN-Z5SY])). This role arguably 
gives CCPs the capacity to create derivatives markets that are less opaque than traditional over-the-counter 
derivatives markets. Levitin, supra, at 451-52. 
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systemic risk.82 By protecting systemically important counterparties from 
counterparty risk, central clearing can remove that trigger.83 
As indicated, however, financial regulation is justified only if its benefits 
exceed its costs.84 The current regulation requiring the central clearing of 
derivatives contracts does not appear to be justified by any formal cost–benefit 
analyses.85 At least in the United States, that may well reflect the Dodd-Frank 
Act’s mandate that reducing systemic risk is so important that regulation reducing 
that risk should not be conditioned on a traditional cost–benefit analysis.86 
 
82 Cf. DUFFIE, LI & LUBKE, supra note 58, at 5 (observing that “[s]ystemic risk also arises 
when the fear of . . . failure could lead counterparties to attempt to avoid potential losses by reducing 
their exposures to a large, weak market participant, possibly contributing to a ‘run’ that indeed 
accelerates the failure of that market participant”); supra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing 
how fear of contracting with Lehman Brothers similarly led to its failure). 
83 Absent central counterparty clearing, for example, a concentration of counterparty exposure 
on a CDS protection seller (for an explanation of CDS protection, see supra note 29 and accompanying 
text) could cause the seller’s failure. If the protection seller is systemically important, its failure in turn 
could potentially trigger a broader systemic economic collapse. The protection seller’s failure could 
cause that collapse not merely by virtue of its inability to pay its general obligations but also by virtue 
of its inability to pay its guarantee obligations on the CDS contracts. This was the very fear that 
prompted the government to bail out AIG, the protection seller on multiple CDS contracts 
guaranteeing repayment on mortgage-backed securities. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
84 See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text. 
85 In its “primer” discussing central clearing of OTC derivatives, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) merely stated without formal cost–benefit analysis that “ultimately the benefits of systemic risk 
reduction from moving OTC derivatives to a CCP very likely outweigh the costs in the longer run.” 
IMF, Meeting New Challenges to Stability and Building a Safer System—Making Over-the-Counter Derivatives 
Safer: The Role of Central Counterparties 26, Global Financial Stability Report (Apr. 2010). When the 
European Commission mandated central clearing of standardized OTC derivatives by amending the 
European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), it pointed to “commitment[s]” by G20 leaders in 
2009 and 2010 to centrally clear these derivatives; but no cost–benefit analysis appears to have justified 
those commitments. See Council Regulation 648/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 201) 1 (EU). But cf. Questions and 
Answers on the Proposal to Amend the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), EUROPEAN 
COMM’N (June 13, 2017), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-17-1583_en.htm [https://perma.cc/
9ER6-4AUC] (noting that the European Commission “is making its proposal [to require standardized 
OTC derivatives contracts to be cleared through a CCP] based on feedback that builds on an extensive 
assessment of EMIR and two public consultations” and that “[t]he main beneficiaries of this proposal 
are citizens and the economy as a whole through a safer financial system where the probability of the 
failure of a CCP and the contagion to the broader financial system is further reduced,” thereby suggesting 
but not confirming the use of cost–benefit analysis). 
86 The Federal Reserve Board, for example, interprets the Dodd-Frank Act as directing the 
Federal Reserve, when regulating to mitigate risks to the financial stability of the country, to bypass 
consideration of costs and benefits. See, e.g., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 
CALIBRATING THE GSIB SURCHARGE 13 (2015), https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/
boardmeetings/gsib-methodology-paper-20150720.pdf [https://perma.cc/3K5B-LX6A] (stating that 
“cost-benefit analysis was not chosen as the primary calibration framework for the GSIB surcharge 
for two reasons [of which the first is that] it is not directly related to the mandate provided by the 
Dodd-Frank Act, which instructs the Board to mitigate risks to the financial stability of the United 
States”); cf. Posner & Weyl, supra note 77, at S3 (observing that because U.S. financial regulatory 
agencies are so-called independent agencies, they have not regarded themselves as bound by 
executive orders requiring the use of cost–benefit analysis). Professors Posner and Weyl also discuss 
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Implicitly, however, regulators have made certain cost–benefit judgments. 
The costs of central clearing include the transaction costs of creating and 
operating the CCPs and also, ironically, systemic costs resulting from 
concentrating counterparty risk in the CCPs.87 Some scholars argue that 
requiring central clearing does not even reduce but merely shifts 
counterparty—and thus systemic—risk from individual counterparties to the 
CCPs.88 Regulators have partly limited the transaction costs by restricting the 
central clearing requirement to standardized derivatives contracts.89 They also 
recognize the systemic costs.90 One Federal Reserve expert warns that the 
“concentration of risk in CCPs must not be underestimated, as CCP failures, 
while rare, do happen.”91 Regulators nonetheless appear to believe, without 
actually testing, that requiring central clearing of derivatives contracts reduces 
overall systemic risk notwithstanding CCP counterparty-risk concentration.92 At 
 
the importance of reducing systemic risk given that historical data suggest the cost of a systemic 
crisis can be as high as twenty percent of gross domestic product (GDP). Eric Posner & E. Glen 
Weyl, Benefit-Cost Analysis for Financial Regulation, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 394 (2013). 
87 To a lesser extent, central clearing can also create costs that arguably are systemic by 
imposing increased and more rigorous margin requirements, which can create significant liquidity 
funding needs. Diana Milanesi, Risk/Benefit Analysis of Central Clearing of Over-the-Counter 
(OTC) Derivatives and a Chaos Theory-Based Perspective on Clearing Mandates 197 (Summer 
2017) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley) (available at 
https://cloudfront.escholarship.org/dist/prd/content/qt8nz4n9z9/qt8nz4n9z9.pdf?t=p2rjix); see also 
CRAIG PIRRONG, CATO INST., THE INEFFICIENCY OF CLEARING MANDATES 3 (2010), 
https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/PA665.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CEZ-UDKH] 
(“Clearinghouses can control moral hazard by imposing margin requirements and limits on the 
amount of insurance provided. Since collateral is socially costly, however, it is socially costly to 
control moral hazard this way.”). To mitigate these costs, CCPs now accept a wide range of assets as 
collateral, subject to appropriate haircuts and, sometimes, hard dollar limits for each class of assets. 
See, e.g., Financial and Collateral Management, CME GRP., https://www.cmegroup.com/clearing/
financial-and-collateral-management.html [https://perma.cc/A7PS-R3QN] (indicating this CCP 
“accept[s] a diverse portfolio of assets as collateral” subject to those limitations); cf. Derivatives Clearing 
Organization General Provisions and Core Principles, 76 Fed. Reg. 69,334, 69,346, 69,349-50 (Nov. 8, 
2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 21, 39, 140) (giving CCPs discretion to choose among a wide 
range of assets to use as margin, provided they apply an appropriate haircut depending on risk). 
88 See infra note 147 and accompanying text. 
89 See infra notes 130–32 and accompanying text (explaining why restricting central clearing to 
standardized financial contracts should reduce transaction costs). 
90 See, e.g., Benoît Coeuré, Member, Executive Bd. of the European Central Bank, Lecture at 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 2015 Symposium on Central Clearing: Ensuring an Adequate 
Loss-Absorbing Capacity of Central Counterparties (Apr. 10, 2015) (transcript available at 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2015/html/sp150411.en.html [https://perma.cc/DW2R-8NTU]); 
Jerome H. Powell, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago Symposium on Central Clearing: Central Clearing and Liquidity (June 
23, 2017) (transcript available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/files/
powell20170623a.pdf [https://perma.cc/FH3J-25BD]). 
91 Ruffini, supra note 78, at 97. 
92 See, e.g., Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech at the SEC Open 
Meeting (Dec. 15, 2010) (transcript available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch121510mls-1.htm 
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least in the United States, that belief may be based in part on the Dodd-Frank 
Act’s protection of certain CCPs as financial market utilities.93 
This Article does not engage the debate on whether requiring central 
clearing of derivatives contracts reduces, or merely shifts, overall systemic 
risk. The widespread reality of that central clearing requirement indicates 
that it may well reduce overall systemic risk. This Article builds on that 
reality to analyze whether regulators should also require central clearing of 
nonderivative financial contracts. This approach follows the strong scholarly 
precedent for grafting a normative legal inquiry onto positive-law reality.94 
In other words, this Article does not necessarily agree on the merits of the 
positive-law reality; it merely uses it as an analytical starting point. 
As informed by this Part II, this Article’s theory can be further restated 
as follows: To reduce systemic risk, regulation should require central clearing 
of nonderivative financial contracts that have at least one systemically 
important counterparty if the benefits of that clearing exceed its costs. To 
reduce costs, the regulation should (as with central clearing of derivatives 
contracts) restrict that central clearing to standardized financial contracts and 
protect the central-clearing CCPs against the systemic costs of concentrated 
counterparty risk. Pragmatically, central clearing should be further limited to 
only “material” contracts that have a minimum potential payment 
obligation.95 Appendix 1 of this Article illustrates how such nonderivative 
financial contracts could be centrally cleared. It also compares that to the 
central clearing of derivatives contracts. Appendix 2 of this Article explains 
how to standardize nonderivative financial contracts. 
Part III next examines the regulatory and economic efficiency 
implications of the restated theory. 
 
[https://perma.cc/DRY9-P34E]) (“When structured and operated appropriately, clearing agencies provide 
important benefits like improving the management of counterparty risk [resulting from derivatives] and 
reducing outstanding exposures through multilateral netting of trades. Through these actions, the ‘clearing’ 
process can help to reduce risks to the financial system overall.”). 
93 See infra Section IV.A. 
94 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. 
REV. 775, 776-77 (1988) (grafting a normative analysis of bankruptcy law (what should be the best 
method for dividing the corporate reorganization pie) onto a positive assumption about that law 
(taking as given the widespread use of the corporate reorganization alternative to liquidation)). 
95 The minimum should be based on the amount of defaulted payment that could reasonably 
destabilize a systemically important counterparty. Although setting the minimum would be a 
regulatory judgment, the author anticipates it would exceed, and might far exceed, ten million dollars. 
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III. CENTRAL CLEARING OF NONDERIVATIVE  
FINANCIAL CONTRACTS 
Reducing systemic risk is an important regulatory goal.96 Central clearing of 
nonderivative financial contracts can, in principle, significantly reduce that risk.97 
Therefore, regulation should require that central clearing98 if the sum of its 
anticipated benefits outweighs, or otherwise justifies, the sum of its anticipated 
costs.99 This cost–benefit balancing also follows Kaldor–Hicks efficiency, the 
practical standard used by economists to assess the economic desirability of a 
project.100 A project is Kaldor–Hicks efficient if its overall benefits exceed its 
overall costs, regardless of who bears the costs and who gets the benefits.101 
Section III.A next estimates the anticipated benefits, and Section III.B 
then estimates the anticipated costs, of centrally clearing nonderivative 
financial contracts. Section III.C thereafter balances those benefits and costs. 
Per the restated theory, these estimates of benefits and costs are restricted to 
central clearing of standardized material nonderivative financial contracts 
that have at least one systemically important counterparty. The estimates also 
assume that CCPs used for that central clearing will be protected against 
concentrated counterparty risk the same way that CCPs used for central 
clearing of derivatives contracts are protected. 
This Article does not, however, attempt to quantify all of the benefits and costs 
of centrally clearing nonderivative financial contracts. Instead, its cost–benefit 
balancing starts by taking as given that the benefits of centrally clearing derivatives 
 
96 Cf. supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text (observing the regulatory importance of 
reducing systemic risk). 
97 Parts I and II of this Article have shown that nonderivative financial contracts can be 
systemically risky, that the aggregate net counterparty exposure on those contracts greatly exceeds 
that on derivatives contracts, and that central clearing of those contracts can reduce systemic risk 
the same way that it reduces systemic risk for derivatives contracts. 
98 This logic follows a consequence-based-inquiry (CBI) normative framework to determine when 
financial market changes should drive legal changes. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Changing Law to 
Address Changing Markets: A Consequence-Based Inquiry, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2017, at 163. 
99 See supra note 77; cf. MAEVE P. CAREY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41974, COST-BENEFIT 
AND OTHER ANALYSIS REQUIREMENTS IN THE RULEMAKING PROCESS 1 (2014) (observing that a 
“proposed regulatory requirement is judged to pass the ‘cost-benefit test’ if the sum of its anticipated 
benefits outweighs, or otherwise justifies, the sum of its present and future costs in present value 
terms” and explaining that “[c]ost-benefit analysis, in [the federal rulemaking] context, involves the 
systematic identification of all of the costs and benefits associated with a forthcoming regulation”); 
WILLIAM F. FOX, UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 187 (6th ed. 2012) (stating that each of 
“the different processes of analysis that sometimes fit[s] under the general umbrella of cost-benefit 
analysis . . . is an attempt to . . . get as much information and insight on a proposed government action 
as possible” (emphasis added)). 
100 ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW IN A MARKET CONTEXT: AN INTRODUCTION TO MARKET 
CONCEPTS IN LEGAL REASONING 190 (2004). 
101 Id. 
 
1348 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 167: 1327 
contracts exceeds its costs.102 From that starting point, the cost–benefit balancing 
of centrally clearing nonderivative financial contracts turns on how those 
benefits and costs vary from those of central clearing derivatives contracts. If, 
for example, the benefits of centrally clearing nonderivative financial contracts 
are at least—and the costs of centrally clearing nonderivative financial contracts 
do not exceed—the respective benefits and costs of centrally clearing 
derivatives contracts, then central clearing of nonderivative financial contracts 
should satisfy a cost–benefit balancing. 
A. Estimating the Benefits of Centrally Clearing  
Nonderivative Financial Contracts 
The primary benefit of centrally clearing nonderivative financial 
contracts—just like that of centrally clearing derivatives contracts—would be 
the reduction of systemic risk at the level of individual systemically important 
counterparties.103 Although the benefit of that risk reduction has not been 
estimated for centrally clearing derivatives contracts, it is almost certainly huge. 
The cost of the financial crisis has been estimated as exceeding twenty-two 
trillion dollars.104 If it reduces the risk of another financial collapse by even ten 
percent, centrally clearing derivatives contracts could save hundreds of billions 
of dollars, if not more. 
Centrally clearing nonderivative financial contracts could reduce systemic 
risk by an amount roughly comparable to (and possibly more than) the 
reduction achieved by centrally clearing derivatives contracts. As previously 
explained, the aggregate counterparty exposure on nonderivative financial 
contracts greatly exceeds that on derivatives contracts.105 The aggregate 
 
102 Cf. supra notes 85–94 and accompanying text (observing that regulators assume, without 
actually testing, that central clearing of derivatives contracts reduces overall systemic costs, and 
stating that because central clearing of derivatives contracts is so widespread, this Article takes that 
regulatory assumption as a starting point for analysis). 
103 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. This cost–benefit analysis does not attempt to 
predict possible ways in which innovative new technologies, such as blockchain and distributed ledger 
technology (DLT), might change bilateral clearing of financial contracts to reduce systemic risk. 
Diana Milanesi has been considering such possibilities and whether new technologies might 
ultimately replace or supplement the need for central clearing. See Milanesi, supra note 87, at 164-65. 
104 Eleazar David Melendez, Financial Crisis Cost Tops $22 Trillion, GAO Says, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Feb. 14, 2013, 7:49 PM ET), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/14/financial-crisis-cost-gao_n_
2687553.html [https://perma.cc/GE7K-RXXF]; cf. FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, THE 
MINNEAPOLIS PLAN TO END TOO BIG TO FAIL 60 (2016), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/~/
media/files/publications/studies/endingtbtf/the-minneapolis-plan/the-minneapolis-plan-to-end-too-
big-to-fail-final.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/829M-EJ68] (observing that as a result of the financial 
crisis, “trillions of dollars in American wealth was destroyed”). 
105 See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text. The news media sometimes incorrectly suggest 
that the opposite is true, referencing the “notional amount” of derivatives outstanding globally (which 
is almost ten times as large as world GDP). See, e.g., $700 Trillion in Global OTC Derivatives? Behind 
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counterparty exposure on the set of nonderivative financial contracts on 
which this Article focuses (those with systemically important counterparties 
and that are standardized106) might, or might not, also exceed the aggregate 
counterparty exposure on the set of derivatives contracts that are required to 
be centrally cleared (those that are standardized).107 Assume, conservatively, 
that the exposures are merely comparable. Because those nonderivative 
financial contracts can be as systemically risky as derivatives contracts, central 
clearing of those contracts should reduce systemic costs by an order of 
magnitude corresponding to the hundreds-of-billions-of-dollars cost 
reduction achieved by centrally clearing derivatives contracts.108 
The foregoing comparison of systemic cost reduction implicitly presumes 
that central clearing would reduce systemic risk for nonderivative financial 
contracts as effectively as it would reduce systemic risk for derivatives 
contracts. Some might argue, however, that central clearing would reduce 
systemic risk more effectively for derivatives contracts, which are more 
susceptible to multilateral netting.109 Multilateral netting refers to a CCP’s 
ability to net offsetting payment obligations among its clearing members110: 
“Multilateral netting allows for the aggregate offset of positions and the 
termination of economically redundant obligations. Multilateral netting 
offsets obligations [among] multiple parties as opposed to bilateral netting, 
which offsets obligations between only two counterparties.”111 
 
the Number, MILKEN INST.: BLOG (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.milkeninstitute.org/blog/view/580 
[https://perma.cc/QF87-DP4P] (discussing the news media’s mistaken reliance on notional amount 
to measure the size of the derivatives market). The notional amount does not reflect the amount at 
risk on a derivative; it merely refers to the value of underlying assets specified in the derivatives contract. 
See, e.g., APANARD PRABHA, KEITH SAVARD & HEATHER WICKRAMARACHI, MILKEN INST., 
DERIVING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF DERIVATIVES 27 (2014), http://assets1b.milkeninstitute.org/
assets/Publication/ResearchReport/PDF/Derivatives-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/5CKQ-ANDS ] 
(“[N]otional amounts outstanding, though a rough measure of derivatives activity, do not represent 
. . . generally, the amount at risk.” (citations omitted)). The more appropriate measure of risk 
exposure—which this Article uses as a basis for comparison—is gross market value. See MONETARY 
& ECON. DEP’T, supra note 14, at 2 (explaining that “gross market value represents the maximum 
loss that market participants would incur if all counterparties failed to meet their contractual 
payments and the contracts could be replaced at current market prices”). 
106 See supra text following note 101. 
107 See supra Section I.B. 
108 See supra notes 103–04 and accompanying text; cf. BAKLANOVA, DALTON & TOMPAIDIS, 
supra note 78, at 6 (estimating the benefits of expanding the central clearing of repo transactions 
beyond dealers as including—merely for that one type of nonderivative financial contract—a $53.7 
billion reduction in net exposure). 
109 Two reviewers of this Article made that argument. 
110 For an explanation of CCP clearing members and their responsibilities, see infra notes 162–67 
and accompanying text. 
111 Ruffini, supra note 78, at 91 (emphasis omitted). 
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The distinction between bilateral and multilateral netting arises from 
basic setoff law. Parties generally have the right to set off, or “net,” mutually 
offsetting matured obligations.112 For example, if Party A owes $1,000,000 to 
Party B and Party B owes $250,000 to Party A, then Party A owes only 
$750,000 to Party B on a net basis after setoff.113 Bilateral setoff refers to this 
type of ordinary setoff between two parties. 
In contrast, multilateral netting refers to setoff among multiple parties. 
Setoff law does not normally permit multilateral netting because setoff rights 
require precise mutuality of obligations.114 Central clearing, however, creates the 
equivalent of mutuality by virtue of novation—in which the CCP legally 
substitutes its credit for that of the contracting parties, making it the primary 
counterparty on both sides of the contract.115 Thus, if clearing member A owes 
clearing member B $1,000,000 and clearing member B owes clearing member C 
$1,000,000, clearing member B’s offsetting obligations will be set off (i.e., netted) 
and clearing member A will simply owe clearing member C the $1,000,000. 
The argument that central clearing would reduce systemic risk more 
effectively for derivatives contracts than for nonderivative financial contracts 
depends, in the first instance, on the former being more susceptible to multilateral 
netting.116 Derivatives contracts are indeed likely to be more susceptible to 
multilateral netting because relatively more counterparties on derivatives 
contracts would be CCP clearing members.117 That reflects the current reality that 
derivatives-contract counterparties tend to be highly concentrated.118 
Ultimately, however, the argument that central clearing would reduce 
systemic risk more effectively for derivatives contracts than for nonderivative 
financial contracts assumes that multilateral netting reduces systemic risk.119 The 
 
112 Stephen L. Sepinuck, The Problems with Setoff: A Proposed Legislative Solution, 30 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 51, 54 (1988). 
113 Used as a noun, the term is a “setoff ”; used as a verb, the expression is to “set off.” 
114 See, e.g., Citizens Bank of Md. v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16, 18 (1995) (“The right of setoff . . . allows 
entities that owe each other money to apply their mutual debts against each other, thereby avoiding ‘the 
absurdity of making A pay B when B owes A.’” (quoting Studley v. Boylston Nat’l Bank, 229 U.S. 
523, 528 (1913))); Mintz v. Tri-County Nat. Gas Co., 103 A. 285, 286 (Pa. 1918) (“Mutuality of debts 
is the essential circumstance of a set-off.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
115 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
116 See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
117 See infra notes 175–77 and accompanying text. 
118 See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 32, at 706 (discussing the concentration of derivatives markets). 
Most of the Options Clearing Corporation’s clearing members, for example, are well-known financial 
institutions like Deutsche Bank Securities Inc., Goldman Sachs & Co., Wells Fargo Securities, LLC, 
and Citigroup Global Markets Inc. See OPTIONS CLEARING CORP., 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 47 
(2017), https://www.theocc.com/components/docs/about/annual-reports/occ-2016-annual-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KK2Q-VBGR]. 
119 Cf. IMF, supra note 85, at 6 (stating that “[m]ultilateral compression and tear-up operations 
eliminate redundant contracts and reduce counterparty risk, and shorten and simplify systemic 
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accuracy of that assumption has not been rigorously tested. Some question that 
assumption, arguing that while multilateral netting can reduce credit risk, it can 
increase systemic risk.120 Professor Mokal further contends that multilateral 
netting encourages greater leverage and thus greater risk, redistributes risk 
rather than diminishes it, weakens lending standards by worsening financial 
agency and adverse selection costs, increases market volatility because net 
exposures are vulnerable to movements that are multiples of the changes in the 
underlying obligations, and spreads the effects of a systemic shock.121 For the 
reasons discussed in Appendix 1, the author also personally questions whether 
multilateral netting reduces systemic risk.122 
This Article does not attempt, however to definitively resolve whether 
multilateral netting reduces systemic risk.123 If multilateral netting does not 
reduce that risk, the benefits of centrally clearing nonderivative financial 
contracts would closely resemble the benefits of centrally clearing derivatives 
contracts. Central clearing of nonderivative financial contracts would then 
more clearly satisfy a cost–benefit balancing. 
Centrally clearing nonderivative financial contracts could also provide benefits 
beyond reducing systemic risk. For example,124 it could reduce transaction costs 
by enabling CCPs to net offsetting contractual obligations, thereby more 
efficiently managing counterparty risk.125 It could also provide an indirect political 
benefit: by shifting counterparty risk from numerous systemically important 
counterparties to a limited number of CCPs, it would facilitate the so-called 
 
interconnections”); Ruffini, supra note 78, at 91 (stating that “multilateral netting of obligations[] often 
result[s] in a reduction of counterparty credit risk and the liquidity risk borne by” clearing members). 
120 See, e.g., BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERBANK 
NETTING SCHEMES OF THE CENTRAL BANKS OF THE GROUP OF TEN COUNTRIES 7 (1990), 
https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d04.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CSN-26KM]. 
121 Mokal, supra note 56, at 19, 60-62. 
122 See infra Appendix 1. 
123 Multilateral netting more clearly increases CCP operational efficiencies. Cf. Froukelien 
Wendt, Central Counterparties: Addressing Their Too Important to Fail Nature 4 (Int’l Monetary Fund, 
Working Paper No. WP/15/21, 2015), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/wp1521.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JW9E-XKL2] (observing that “multilateral netting . . . reduc[es] the total credit 
exposure in the market as well as the number of transactions that need to be settled, which results 
in operational efficiencies” (footnote omitted)). 
124 Another possible benefit of centrally clearing nonderivative financial contracts is that it 
might increase transparency. Cf. John Hull, OTC Derivatives and Central Clearing: Can All 
Transactions Be Cleared?, FIN. STABILITY REV., July 2010, at 71, 76 (arguing that a benefit of centrally 
clearing nonstandard derivatives contracts would be increasing transparency). 
125 See, e.g., Cyril Monnet, Let’s Make It Clear: How Central Counterparties Save(d) the Day, BUS. 
REV., Q1 2010, at 1, 5 (“[T]he CCP works best if contracts are completely standardized . . . . [N]etting 
is limited if contracts are only imperfectly substitutable.”); cf. Mokal, supra note 56, at 58-59 (observing 
that netting allows CCP members to collateralize only their net rather than gross exposures (enabling 
members to stretch collateral to cover a greater volume of transactions), enables a more efficient use of 
regulatory capital, and enhances liquidity by allowing flexibility across legal categories and asset types). 
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single-point-of-entry (SPOE) resolution strategy currently pursued by 
regulators. This strategy is artificially dependent, among other things, on 
government receivership and operation of a troubled systemically important 
firm.126 Concentrating risk in CCPs could reduce the number of government 
receiverships that are needed under that strategy—a benefit that could help to 
offset the potential moral hazard cost of that risk concentration.127 
B. Estimating the Costs of Centrally Clearing Nonderivative Financial Contracts 
Although the benefits of centrally clearing nonderivative financial 
contracts could be huge, such clearing would generate at least two types of 
costs: the transaction costs of creating and operating the CCPs, and the 
possible systemic costs of concentrating counterparty risk in the CCPs.128 
Consider each in turn. 
1. Transaction Costs 
The transaction costs of creating and operating CCPs for centrally clearing 
nonderivative financial contracts would not appear to be very different from the 
transaction costs of existing CCPs. An existing CCP whose clearing members 
include the relevant counterparties could even clear both types of contracts. 
A possible difference in operating costs might result from nonderivative 
financial contracts being less standardized than derivative contracts. 
Standardization reduces transaction costs because CCPs can much more easily 
net offsetting obligations on standardized contracts than on nonstandardized 
contracts.129 This cost differential might become insignificant, however, 
because nonderivative financial contracts increasingly are being documented 
on a standardized basis, like derivative contracts.130 Indeed, many 
 
126 John Crawford, “Single Point of Entry”: The Promise and Limits of the Latest Cure for Bailouts, 
109 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 103, 107 (2014). 
127 Cf. infra notes 145–53 and accompanying text (discussing the too big to fail problem). 
128 See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
129 To understand why, consider how netting works. Central clearing practice allows a CCP to net 
offsetting obligations even if they are between different members of the CCP. For example, a CCP can 
net the obligation of member X to deliver a security to the CCP against the CCP’s concurrent obligation 
to deliver that same security to member Y. See 27. What Does a CCP Do? What Are the Pros and Cons?, 
INT’L CAPITAL MKTS. ASS’N, http://www.icmagroup.org/Regulatory-Policy-and-Market-Practice/
repo-and-collateral-markets/frequently-asked-questions-on-repo/27-what-does-a-ccp-do-what-are-
the-pros-and-cons [https://perma.cc/FE2M-MRQK] [hereinafter What Does a CCP Do?] (describing the 
process of netting for CCPs). In contrast, “[n]onstandard contracts cannot be netted, since each one’s 
cash flow characteristics are different.” IMF, supra note 85, at 6. 
130 Another reason the cost differential might be insignificant is that a significant portion of 
derivatives contracts, referred to as over-the-counter derivatives, are themselves not standardized. 
Prior to postcrisis financial regulation, most derivatives were OTC. Levitin, supra note 81, at 449. 
Even after the financial crisis, the notional amount of OTC derivatives has been estimated as $693 
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nonderivative financial contracts are being documented on standard form 
contracts developed by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
(ISDA) for documenting derivatives transactions. This is being done to gain 
the advantage of bankruptcy law’s “safe harbor” exemptions for derivatives 
contracts.131 Loan agreements and virtually any other type of financial contract 
can be documented as a derivatives contract.132 Some textbooks are even 
openly encouraging parties to document financing contracts as derivatives 
contracts in order to take advantage of that safe harbor.133 
Any cost differential could also be managed. The laws requiring central 
clearing of derivatives contracts control transaction costs by limiting such 
clearing to standardized derivatives contracts.134 Any laws requiring central 
clearing of nonderivative financial contracts could likewise—and this Article 
has proposed that any such laws should135—control transaction costs by limiting 
such clearing to standardized136 nonderivative financial contracts. Appendix 2 
of this Article discusses standardized nonderivative financial contracts. 
The fact that CCPs are often associated with derivatives and commodities 
exchanges,137 whereas nonderivative financial contracts are less likely to depend 
on exchanges,138 might appear to create another possible transaction-cost 
 
trillion worldwide. MONETARY & ECON. DEP’T, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, STATISTICAL 
RELEASE OTC DERIVATIVES STATISTICS AT END-JUNE 2013, at 2 (2013), http://www.bis.org/publ/
otc_hy1311.pdf [https://perma.cc/RJ6Z-VBXE]. 
131 Steven L. Schwarcz & Ori Sharon, The Bankruptcy-Law Safe Harbor for Derivatives: A Path-
Dependence Analysis, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1715, 1752 (2014). 
132 Id. at 1752. 
133 See id.; see also Franklin R. Edwards & Edward R. Morrison, Derivatives and the Bankruptcy 
Code: Why the Special Treatment?, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 91, 121 (2005); Bryan G. Faubus, Narrowing 
the Bankruptcy Safe Harbor for Derivatives to Combat Systemic Risk, 59 DUKE L.J. 801, 828-29 (2010). 
134 See also HECKINGER, RUFFINI & WELLS, supra note 37, at 31 (stating that “[w]hether or 
not an OTC trade is cleared on a CCP depends on the degree of standardization of contract terms”); 
IMF, supra note 85, at 12 (addressing that “U.S. authorities are proposing legislation that will 
incentivize, if not mandate, clearing ‘eligible’ OTC derivatives through CCPs”); CFTC Reports, U.S. 
COMMODITIES FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, https://www.cftc.gov/About/CFTCReports/
index.htm [https://perma.cc/Z34H-YRQ4] (“Standardized derivatives will be required to trade on 
open platforms and be submitted for clearing to central counterparties . . . .”); cf. supra text 
accompanying note 89 (observing that regulators have partly limited transaction costs by restricting 
central clearing only to standardized derivatives contracts); supra notes 130–32 and accompanying text. 
135 See supra text accompanying notes 94–95. 
136 This Article does not examine whether nonstandardized financial contracts should be 
centrally cleared. Cf. Hull, supra note 124, at 74-75 (advocating that all derivatives contracts—especially 
nonstandard OTC contracts, because those are the most likely to be used for large speculative 
positions that can increase systemic risk—be centrally cleared). Hull argues that the difficulties of 
centrally clearing nonstandard derivatives contracts would be outweighed by the benefits, which 
include reducing counterparty risk and increasing transparency. See id. at 76-77. He also says that 
nonstandard contracts could be netted if they could be valued daily. Id. 
137 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
138 A loan agreement, for example, is rarely traded on an exchange. 
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differential.139 In recent years however, many CCPs have decoupled their 
exchange affiliation and started operating as independent companies.140 This 
suggests that their profitability, which is dependent on controlling transaction 
costs, is not necessarily tied to particular exchanges. 
2. Systemic Costs 
The primary costs of centrally clearing nonderivative financial contracts 
would be, paradoxically, potentially increasing systemic costs: by 
concentrating counterparty risk in CCPs, central clearing makes the CCPs 
even more systemically important than the original counterparties.141 In other 
words, central clearing would reduce the systemic costs of individual 
systemically important counterparties but increase the systemic costs of 
CCPs. The question is whether it reduces the overall systemic costs. 
Even in the derivatives context, there is controversy whether central 
clearing reduces overall systemic costs.142 Regulators assume, however, that 
it does reduce those overall costs.143 This subsection’s focus is therefore on 
whether central clearing of nonderivative financial contracts would change 
that overall systemic cost balance. 
Central clearing of nonderivative financial contracts would reduce the 
systemic costs of individual systemically important counterparties the same 
way—by having CCPs assume the counterparty risk—that central clearing of 
derivatives contracts reduces those systemic costs. Therefore, if those CCPs 
are protected against risk concentration at least as well as CCPs that centrally 
clear derivatives contracts are protected, central clearing of nonderivative 
financial contracts should not change that overall cost balance.144 Part IV of 
this Article explains how those CCPs could be equally well protected. 
 
139 No informational or expertise-related transaction-cost differential should result from CCPs 
clearing nonderivative financial contracts, with which they are not familiar. The clearing members 
themselves, not the CCP, value the credit risk on the contracts being cleared. Cf. supra text 
accompanying note 117 (discussing counterparties as CCP clearing members). 
140 See infra note 163 (observing that many CCPs have now become independent companies). 
141 Cf. What Does a CCP Do?, supra note 129 (describing a drawback of centrally clearing 
derivatives contracts as “concentrat[ing]” risk in CCPs, “which will themselves become potential 
sources of systemic risk”). Their size, interconnectedness with clearing members, and lack of 
substitutability make CCPs highly systemically risky. Cf. supra text accompanying note 55 
(discussing size, interconnectedness, and substitutability as the three main determinants of systemic 
risk). Central clearing might also increase the correlation of risks among systemically important 
firms. The financial crisis intensified when numerous systemically important firms began to fail 
because of their correlated investments (in MBS). 
142 See supra notes 85–93 and accompanying text. 
143 See supra notes 85–93 and accompanying text. 
144 Central clearing of nonderivative financial contracts might even improve the overall cost 
balance by enabling CCPs to clear a larger number of contracts. Cf. RODNEY GARRATT & PETER 
ZIMMERMAN, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT NO. 717, DOES CENTRAL CLEARING 
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Centrally clearing nonderivative financial contracts might, however, 
increase the perception of systemic costs tied to the so-called “too big to fail” 
(TBTF) problem—that systemically important financial firms might engage 
in excessive risk taking because they would profit from success and be bailed 
out by the government to avoid a failure.145 There is an increasing worldwide 
regulatory focus on trying to end the TBTF problem.146 
Critics have argued, in the derivatives context, that CCPs are the “ultimate” 
too big to fail organizations.147 Because a CCP is “a central node in the financial 
system,” and thus highly interconnected with other financial institutions,148 its 
failure could have effects similar to what was feared could happen if AIG had 
failed during the financial crisis149—what has been described as “staring into 
the abyss.”150 For example, a CCP’s failure could suspend all or a portion of the 
market for derivatives transactions, causing systemic contagion including “fire 
sales of collateral or derivatives contracts, exacerbating broad market 
volatility.”151 The government would therefore almost certainly have to bail out 
a failing CCP. And the expectation of a bailout could foster moral hazard, 
incentivizing CCPs themselves to take greater risks.152 
 
REDUCE COUNTERPARTY RISK IN REALISTIC FINANCIAL NETWORKS? 1 (2015) (arguing that a 
CCP’s netting is unlikely to be valuable when the network relies on only a few key nodes). 
145 This is primarily a problem of moral hazard; persons protected from the negative 
consequences of their risky actions will be tempted to take more risks. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Too 
Big to Fool: Moral Hazard, Bailouts, and Corporate Responsibility, 102 MINN. L. REV. 761, 761 (2017) 
(analyzing the TBTF problem and the causes of excessive risk taking). 
146 See id. at 762-63 (discussing regulatory efforts by the U.S. Federal Reserve and also by the 
Financial Stability Board, an organization established by the G20 nations, to monitor and make 
recommendations about the global financial system). 
147 See, e.g., Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an Analytical 
Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1394-95 (2011) (observing that centralized clearing of 
derivatives would shift counterparty risk from individual counterparties to the CCP, thereby 
concentrating the risk); Mark J. Roe, Clearinghouse Overconfidence, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1641, 1692 n.123 
(2013) (collecting sources); Yadav, supra note 39, at 387, 391 (challenging the “academic and policy 
consensus that clearinghouses adequately mitigate the risks of trading credit derivatives”). 
148 Cf. supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text (discussing interconnectedness as one of the 
three systemic risk factors). 
149 See, e.g., Steven McNamara, Financial Markets Uncertainty and the Rawlsian Argument for 
Central Counterparty Clearing of OTC Derivatives, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 209, 
259 (2014) (“The urge to backstop [a CCP] in the event of a market crisis would be considerable, 
and governments could then be faced with the ultimate ‘TBTF’ entity.”). 
150 Jeff Kearns & Robert Schmidt, From Davos to Big Sur, Geithner Recounts Staring into the Abyss, 
BLOOMBERG (May 10, 2014, 12:00 AM EDT), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-05-09/
geithner-recounts-standing-at-big-sur-cliff-edge-as-crisis-grew. 
151 See Darrell Duffie, Resolution of Failing Central Counterparties (arguing that a CCP’s “fail[ure] 
to meet its obligations to other systemically [important] clearing members” could cause that 
contagion), in MAKING FAILURE FEASIBLE: HOW BANKRUPTCY REFORM CAN END “TOO BIG 
TO FAIL” 87, 88 (Kenneth E. Scott, Thomas H. Jackson & John B. Taylor eds., 2015). 
152 Cf. Levitin, supra note 81, at 464 (arguing that, without proper regulation, CCPs may 
engage in underpriced risk taking, thereby increasing systemic risk). 
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Qualitatively, any such perception of systemic costs should be no different 
whether CCPs clear derivatives contracts or nonderivative financial contracts. 
Quantitatively, however, requiring nonderivative financial contracts to be centrally 
cleared would add to the volume of CCP clearing, thereby possibly increasing that 
perception. Such an increased perception would certainly represent a political 
cost. It unlikely represents an increase in actual systemic costs, however, because 
there is no real evidence that the TBTF problem increases risk taking.153 
C. Balancing Benefits and Costs 
The analysis in Sections III.A and III.B indicates that—other than 
possible differences in the benefits of multilateral netting—the benefits and 
the costs of centrally clearing nonderivative financial contracts would roughly 
parallel those of centrally clearing derivatives contracts. Both types of 
contracts are standardized financial contracts that have systemically 
important counterparties.154 Although centrally clearing nonderivative 
financial contracts might increase the perception of systemic costs tied to the 
TBTF problem, any such increase would represent political, not actual, costs 
and thus should not strictly be included in a cost–benefit balancing.155 
Accordingly, if the benefits of centrally clearing derivatives contracts exceed 
its costs (which, as discussed, is an untested premise156), then—again subject 
to possible differences in the benefits of multilateral netting—the benefits of 
centrally clearing nonderivative financial contracts might also exceed its costs. 
Because its cost–benefit balancing is based on rough approximations, an 
untested premise, and possible differences in the benefits of multilateral netting, 
this Article cannot—and does not purport to—conclude that regulation should 
require central clearing of nonderivative financial contracts. Nonetheless, this 
Article’s approach to cost–benefit balancing should provide a useful way of thinking 
about whether regulators should impose that central clearing requirement.157 
 
153 Schwarcz, supra note 145, at 764-69. 
154 Derivatives contracts are at least likely to have, and the nonderivative financial contracts 
analyzed in this Article are limited to those that have, at least one systemically important counterparty. 
155 See C.W., Why Doing a Cost-Benefit Analysis Is Harder than It Looks, ECONOMIST: THE 
ECONOMIST EXPLAINS (Apr. 24, 2014), https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2014/
04/23/why-doing-a-cost-benefit-analysis-is-harder-than-it-looks [https://perma.cc/3YVT-4XH6] (“The 
aim [of a cost–benefit analysis] is to provide an impartial, evidence-based judgment of the costs and 
benefits of a particular policy or project, without regard to its political ramifications.” (emphasis added)). 
156 See supra text accompanying note 92. Recall that this Article builds on the widespread 
reality of the central clearing requirement for derivatives contracts as an indicator that such clearing 
may well reduce overall systemic risk, without necessarily agreeing whether it reduces that overall 
risk. See supra text accompanying note 94. 
157 Even detailed empirical research by the U.S. Office of Financial Research has not yet 
provided a more useful way of thinking about the value of requiring central clearing. Cf. 
BAKLANOVA, DALTON & TOMPAIDIS, supra note 78, at 7 (reaching a noncommittal conclusion, itself 
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In the United States, there may be an additional way to think about the value 
of requiring central clearing for nonderivative financial contracts. Recall that 
Congress has viewed systemic risk regulation so important as to exempt it from 
traditional cost–benefit analysis.158 If regulation requiring central clearing for 
nonderivative financial contracts follows that mandate, the only cost–benefit 
question would be whether the regulation reduces overall systemic costs, i.e., 
whether its reduction of systemic costs of individual systemically important 
counterparties outweighs the increase of systemic costs caused by concentrating 
CCP counterparty risk. By ignoring transaction costs, that affords an even easier 
cost–benefit balancing in favor of regulation requiring central clearing for 
nonderivative financial contracts. 
IV. ADAPTING AND ENHANCING CENTRAL COUNTERPARTY  
RISK PROTECTION 
The foregoing cost–benefit analysis presupposes that CCPs used for 
centrally clearing nonderivative financial contracts would be protected against 
risk concentration at least as well as are CCPs used for centrally clearing 
derivatives contracts.159 This Part explains why those CCPs could be equally 
well protected. To that end, Section IV.A examines how current protections 
could be adapted to CCPs used to clear nonderivative financial contracts. 
Thereafter, Section IV.B examines how those protections could be enhanced, 
which would make central clearing of nonderivative financial contracts even 
more likely to satisfy a cost–benefit balancing. 
A. Adapting Existing Protections 
All of the current protections against CCP risk concentration either would 
apply, or could be adapted, to CCPs used to clear nonderivative financial 
contracts.160 CCPs currently employ various protections against risk 
concentration, and thus against the risk of default.161 To minimize these risks, 
 
based on “[s]everal caveats,” as to whether “the potential benefits outweigh the costs” for expanding 
central clearing of repo transactions to transactions involving nondealers). 
158 See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
159 See supra text accompanying note 144. 
160 Although the textual discussion primarily addresses U.S.-based CCPs, the European Union 
has similar protections against CCP risk concentration. See Bas Zebregs & Victor de Serière, Efforts 
to Strengthen the Clearing and Settlement Framework of the Capital Markets Union, in CAPITAL MARKETS 
UNION IN EUROPE 526, 531-35 (Danny Busch, Emilios Avgouleas & Guido Ferrarini eds., 2018). 
161 See NORMAN, supra note 6, at 10 (“Because a CCP represents a single point of failure, it 
needs to be bullet proof.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. 
Dir., Bank of Eng., Remarks at Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 45th Annual Conference 
“Reforming Financial Regulation”: Small Lessons from a Big Crisis 5 (May 8, 2009) (transcript 
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CCPs typically grant central clearing services to a relatively small number of 
firms, normally limited to well-capitalized banks and other large financial 
institutions that become “clearing members” of the CCP.162 By becoming 
clearing members, firms assume various responsibilities that help to support 
the CCP’s financial integrity.163 These include agreeing to maintain sufficient 
collateral to reimburse the CCP for payment of the clearing member’s 
individual counterparty obligations,164 to contribute (on a pro rata basis with 
the other clearing members) to a loss-absorbency fund that can be used to cover 
the CCP’s losses in case a clearing member fails to so reimburse the CCP,165 
and to pay capital assessments into the CCP as needed to keep it solvent.166 
 
available at https://www.bis.org/review/r090710e.pdf [https://perma.cc/6RS4-GD3F])); cf. supra 
note 8 and accompanying text (observing that counterparty risk is sometimes called default risk). 
162 See Levitin, supra note 81, at 451 (describing the various risk management tools available to 
CCPs); see also INTERCONTINENTAL EXCH., INC., MANAGE YOUR RISK: HOW CLEARING 
WORKS 2 (2016), https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/How_Clearing_Works.pdf [https://perma.cc/
A38C-9Q42] (“[C]learing houses have in place a comprehensive set of procedures and a robust risk 
management framework that includes: [r]eal-time position monitoring[, i]ntraday mark to market 
margining[, s]ubstantial default resources[, r]igorous stress testing[, c]omprehensive oversight[, and 
e]xtensive transparency.”). Firms other than clearing members can only get access to the derivatives 
market through clearing members. NORMAN, supra note 6, at 10. 
163 Originally, CCPs were owned by their clearing members, but many CCPs have now 
demutualized and become part of publicly traded companies. CCPs nonetheless continue to enforce 
strict membership responsibilities to help support their own financial integrity. Ruffini, supra note 
78, at 91; cf. Paolo Saguato, The Ownership of Clearinghouses: When “Skin in the Game” Is Not Enough, 
the Remutualization of Clearinghouses, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 601, 635-40 (2017) (assessing the 
implications of different ownership structures on CCPs’ resilience). These strict membership 
responsibilities, however, typically limit clearing members to large and often systemically important 
banks and other firms, thereby linking CCP risk back to those firms, which in turn could “lead to a 
self-reinforcing [destabilising] feedback loop” in “periods of stress.” Umar Faruqui, Wenqian Huang 
& Előd Takáts, Clearing Risks in OTC Derivatives Markets: The CCP-Bank Nexus, BIS Q. REV., Dec. 
2018, at 73, 74-78; see also id. at 78 (observing that a “handful of systemically important banks 
typically comprise the main clearing members”). Because of this potential for a self-reinforcing 
feedback loop, “the risks of banks and CCPs should be considered jointly, rather than in isolation.” 
Id. at 74. Faruqui, Huang, and Takáts emphasize though that their findings “should not be used to 
assess the relative merits of central and bilateral clearing.” Id. 
164 This can help a CCP avoid illiquidity, especially by requiring clearing members to post variation 
margin on a daily basis depending on changes in the counterparties’ positions. Sergei A. Davydenko, 
Insolvency, Illiquidity, and the Risk of Default 1-6 (Feb. 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (available at 
http://www-2.rotman.utoronto.ca/davydenko/liquidity.pdf [https://perma.cc/35DR-CXPB]). 
165 This creates an incentive for each clearing member to monitor the creditworthiness of the other 
clearing members. Cf. Cox & Steigerwald, supra note 15, at 11 (arguing that “the mutualized risk characteristic 
of the CCP” incentivizes clearing members to take active steps to try to reduce the CCP’s risk). 
166 NORMAN, supra note 6, at 10. A risk-management officer of a large CCP observed at a 
Federal Reserve conference attended by the author that, in his experience, clearing members are 
ordinarily required to prefund one assessment and are subject to one additional assessment, after 
which they could choose to resign from membership. 
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To further minimize default risk,167 a CCP may buy protection to hedge 
its payment obligations.168 To cover a worst-case scenario where these 
measures are insufficient and the CCP faces insolvency or illiquidity,169 U.S. 
law at least gives CCPs that are classified as financial market utilities (FMUs) 
access to central bank emergency funding.170 
Many of these protections would apply to CCPs equally whether they 
clear derivatives contracts or nonderivative financial contracts. For example, 
the distinction between those contracts is irrelevant both to a CCP’s ability 
to buy protection to hedge its potential obligations to pay a net aggregate 
liability171 and to a clearing member’s responsibility to maintain sufficient 
collateral to reimburse the CCP for payment of its individual counterparty 
obligations.172 Similarly, that distinction is irrelevant to a central bank’s 
decision to grant CCPs access to central bank emergency funding.173 
The distinction between those contracts might be relevant, however, to 
certain protections against CCP risk concentration. For example, recall that 
CCPs used to clear derivatives contracts typically grant central clearing 
services to only a relatively small number of well-capitalized large financial 
institutions, which assume various responsibilities to help support the CCP’s 
 
167 Through multilateral netting, a CCP normally also has the right to periodically net and set 
off its clearing members’ aggregate counterparty rights and liabilities, so the CCP is only required 
to make a payment if there is a net aggregate liability. The extent to which this actually reduces 
risk—or at least, systemic risk—is somewhat uncertain. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
168 For example, if the Chicago Mercantile Exchange’s CCP, CME Clearing Services, assumes 
responsibility to clear a CDS contract that covers the risk of a commodities trade, CME Clearing Services 
may itself choose to hedge that risk by purchasing protection under a corresponding CDS contract. 
169 Insolvency means that the CCP’s liabilities exceed the value of its assets whereas illiquidity 
means that the CCP does not have enough cash or near-cash assets to pay its current liabilities as they 
come due. A CCP thus can be illiquid without being insolvent, and vice versa. CCP illiquidity is the 
more common and pressing issue because an illiquid CCP cannot pay all of its counterparty 
obligations. Insolvency is often difficult to determine because asset valuation in a financially distressed 
situation is often hotly contested, including whether to value the assets at their going-concern or their 
liquidation value. See, e.g., Matthew C. Klein, Illiquid, Insolvent, What’s the Difference?, FIN. 
TIMES: ALPHAVILLE (Sep. 30, 2014, 3:50 PM), https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2014/09/30/1988932/
illiquid-insolvent-whats-the-difference [https://perma.cc/E6BP-VJNP]. 
170 Section 806(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act gives the Federal Reserve power to provide discount-window 
lending, a form of liquidity, to FMUs “in unusual or exigent circumstances.” Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 806(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1811 (2010) (codified 
at 12 U.S.C. § 5465(b) (2012)). 
171 Cf. supra note 168 and accompanying text (discussing the purchase of hedging protection). 
172 For loan agreements, requiring clearing members to post variation margin depending on changes 
in the counterparties’ positions might be tied to changes in borrowers’ creditworthiness as evidenced by 
any downgrades of their senior debt credit ratings. Cf. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK 
FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, HIGH-LEVEL SUMMARY OF BASEL III REFORMS 2 (2017), 
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424_hlsummary.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9CX-LAQV] (summarizing and 
comparing the use of credit ratings to assess credit risk under the Basel III and their predecessor (Basel II) 
capital-adequacy requirements). 
173 Cf. supra notes 169–71 and accompanying text (discussing central bank emergency funding). 
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financial integrity.174 Limiting CCP clearing membership in that way does not 
appear to impede central clearing of standardized derivatives contracts because 
most parties to such contracts are in fact well-capitalized large financial 
institutions.175 That limitation, however, might impede central clearing of 
nonderivative financial contracts with smaller or less well-capitalized firms as 
counterparties.176 For CCPs used to clear those nonderivative financial 
contracts, these “member-provided” protections would need to be adapted. 
Fortuitously, a recent study by the U.S. Office of Financial Research suggests 
how to adapt member-provided protections to smaller or less well-capitalized 
firms as counterparties. The study considers whether central clearing of repo 
transactions,177 which currently occurs for transactions between dealers, 
should be expanded to also cover transactions between dealers and 
nondealers.178 It assumes that only the dealers are CCP clearing members.179 
It also recognizes, as does this Article, that member-provided protections are 
needed to help offset the CCPs’ increased risk concentration.180 The study 
suggests that, to “ensure that [a] CCP could withstand potential losses from 
[nondealer] defaults,” its clearing members should make “additional funding 
contributions” to the CCP.181 That same approach—requiring the CCP 
clearing members to make any additional funding needed to support the 
CCP’s financial integrity—could also be used to protect CCPs that clear 
nonderivative financial contracts.182 
 
174 See supra notes 162–67 and accompanying text. 
175 Cf. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK 
TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITY 3 (2016), https://www.occ.gov/topics/capital-markets/
financial-markets/derivatives/pub-derivatives-quarterly-qtr3-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/GZL9-SUFA] 
(reporting that “[a] small group of large financial institutions continues to dominate derivative activity 
in the U.S. commercial banking system”). 
176 For example, a borrower on a loan agreement could be a medium-sized company, or a large company 
that is less well capitalized than a financial institution. The minimum-potential-payment-obligation limitation 
may well exclude the need to centrally clear smaller loans. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
177 For an explanation of repo transactions, see supra text accompanying notes 71–72. 
178 See BAKLANOVA, DALTON & TOMPAIDIS, supra note 78, at 3. 
179 See id. (observing that “[e]xpanding access to repo CCPs would involve centrally clearing 
bilateral transactions between dealers, who are members of CCPs, and their clients (nondealers), 
who are not members”). 
180 See id. (observing that if “a repo CCP were expanded to process repo transactions involving 
nondealers, the exposures of the CCP would increase”). 
181 Id. 
182 The Office of Financial Research study uses a model in which “dealers would clear and 
guarantee transactions with the CCP on behalf of their [nondealer] clients.” Id. at 5. The discussion 
above assumes that CCP clearing of nonderivative financial contracts follows that model. 
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B. Enhancing the Protections 
Another question is whether the protections against CCP risk 
concentration could be enhanced. From the standpoint of enhancing 
protection, nothing appears to distinguish CCPs used to clear derivatives 
contracts from CCPs used to clear nonderivative financial contracts. 
However, because centrally clearing nonderivative financial contracts would 
greatly expand the use of CCPs, regulators might consider more proactively 
protecting them—regardless of which contracts they clear. 
Ringfencing represents at least one way to more proactively protect CCPs. 
Ringfencing refers to using regulation and contracting to “legally deconstruct[] 
a firm in order to more optimally reallocate and reduce risk.”183 This can consist 
of “separating risky assets from the firm, . . . preventing the firm itself from 
engaging in risky activities or investing in risky assets, or . . . protecting the 
firm from affiliate and bankruptcy risks.”184 In the context of a CCP, this might 
involve limiting dividends and other payments to affiliates185 and making the 
CCP part of a bankruptcy-remote structure.186 
Because it is costly, ringfencing is most applicable to protect monopoly or 
semimonopoly entities, which have few if any substitutes, that provide 
essential public services; thus, it is commonly used to protect public utilities 
that produce and disseminate electric energy.187 This is especially valuable 
where the utility is part of a holding company or other corporate structure 
that involves nonutility risk, such that insulation of the utility from that risk 
helps to assure unimpaired continuation of the public services.188 
CCPs, like public utilities, provide essential public services—in the case of 
CCPs, by (arguably) reducing systemic risk and thus ensuring the ongoing 
operation of the financial system. Also, like public utilities, CCPs have few if any 
substitutes;189 indeed, they are often best situated to perform clearing services.190 
Furthermore, CCPs are often part of a corporate structure that involves non-CCP 
risk. Ringfencing would be especially valuable in that last context. 
For example, ICE Clear Credit, a CCP that provides central counterparty 
clearing services for CDS contracts, is an indirect subsidiary of 
 
183 Steven L. Schwarcz, Ring-Fencing, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 69, 72 (2013). 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at 77-78. 
186 Id. at 76. 
187 Id. at 105-06. 
188 Id. at 74. 
189 Cox & Steigerwald, supra note 15, at 14 (observing that “there are few substitutes for most 
systemically important CCPs”). 
190 See, e.g., FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 157, 160, 174 (2012), 
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Documents/2012%20Annual%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
56V4-E8PV]. 
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Intercontinental Exchange, Inc.191 Intercontinental Exchange, Inc. engages in 
an aggressive acquisition strategy192 that has caused it to incur significant 
debt,193 and “[m]any aspects of [its] business . . .[also] involve substantial risks 
of liability.”194 Ringfencing ICE Clear Credit would help to protect it from its 
parent company’s financial and operating risks, thereby assuring continued 
performance of the CCP’s clearing services even if the parent fails.195 
Using ringfencing to more proactively protect CCPs would reduce 
systemic costs but increase transaction costs. If the reduction of systemic costs 
is greater than the increase in transaction costs, ringfencing would make 
central clearing of nonderivative financial contracts even more likely to satisfy 
a cost–benefit balancing. 
V. JURISPRUDENTIAL PERSPECTIVES 
This Article has analyzed whether regulators should expand the central 
clearing requirement to include nonderivative financial contracts. The very 
idea that regulators should require financial institutions to centrally clear their 
financial contracts—whether derivatives or nonderivative contracts—raises 
fundamental questions about the justification for financial regulation. 
Analytically, this Article so far has utilized the standard justification: that 
financial regulation is justified if its benefits exceed its costs.196 This Part V 
examines that justification in more depth. To that end, Section V.A examines 
whether regulators should mandate how financial institutions control their 
risk. Section V.B then examines whether regulators should require financial 
institutions to mutualize risk. 
 
191 Id. at 172. 
192 See INTERCONTINENTAL EXCH., INC., 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 29 (2017), http://ir.theice.com/~/
media/Files/I/Ice-IR/annual-reports/2016/2016-annual-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/FA2K-QF82] 
(“We may be very acquisitive.”). 
193 See id. at 31 (“Following our acquisition of NYSE and Interactive Data, we have a significant 
amount of indebtedness outstanding on a consolidated basis.”). 
194 See id. at 33 (“Many aspects of our business . . . involve substantial risks of liability . . . . For 
example, dissatisfied market participants that have traded on our electronic platform . . . may make 
claims regarding the quality of trade execution, or allege improperly confirmed or settled trades, 
abusive trading practices, security and confidentiality breaches, mismanagement or even fraud against 
us or our participants . . . . An adverse resolution of any lawsuit or claim against us may require us to 
pay substantial damages . . . .”). 
195 As another example, CME Clearing, a CCP that clears the vast majority of the derivatives 
contracts for U.S. futures, options on futures, and commodity options, is an unincorporated division 
of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 190, at 157. 
Ringfencing CME Clearing could help to insulate it from exchange-related risks, thereby assuring 
unimpaired continuation of its clearing services even if the exchange fails. 
196 See supra notes 77, 84 and accompanying text. 
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A. Should Regulators Mandate How Financial Institutions Control Their Risk? 
The standard justification for financial regulation presents a puzzle, at least 
when applied to risk taking by sophisticated financial institutions: Why would the 
benefits of financial regulation ever exceed its costs? In principle, those institutions 
should know best how to control their own risk. To the extent they are protecting 
their investors, they also have incentives to control that risk. For these reasons, bank 
regulation “rarely mandates a specific way [for a financial institution] to mitigate 
risk, ie [sic] whether to take out insurance or to take assets as collateral, etc.”197 
The primary goal of financial regulation, however, should be to correct 
market failures.198 Regulation that corrects a market failure might well provide 
benefits that exceed the regulation’s costs. Risk taking by sophisticated 
financial institutions can be subject to market failures, most typically 
evidenced by externalities.199 For example, government deposit insurance is 
commonly seen as distorting a deposit-taking bank’s control of risk. Such 
insurance increases risk taking because if the bank fails, much of the cost of its 
failure would be externalized onto the government and taxpayers.200 
To help control that risk taking, regulators commonly impose capital 
requirements on banks.201 Most notably, the Basel Accords require banks to 
maintain minimum equity (or “capital”) levels tied to their loan exposure, in 
order to protect them against unexpected losses.202 The scholarship on 
 
197 Peter O. Mülbert, Managing Risk in the Financial System, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
FINANCIAL REGULATION 365, 395 (Niamh Moloney, Eilís Ferran & Jennifer Payne eds., 2015). 
198 See, e.g., DAVID GOWLAND, THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL MARKETS IN THE 1990S 
21 (1990) (characterizing regulating markets to correct market failure as the “public interest theory”); 
cf. PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 756 (15th ed. 1995) (defining 
market failure as an “imperfection in a price system that prevents efficient allocation of resources”). 
199 Although economists often categorize externalities as a type of market failure, externalities 
more precisely are caused by market failures. Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Shadows: Financial 
Regulation and Responsibility Failure, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1781, 1799-1800 (2013). 
200 See, e.g., Robert L. Hetzel, Should Increased Regulation of Bank Risk-Taking Come from 
Regulators or from the Market?, 95 ECON. Q. 161, 166 (2009) (illustrating that “[a] financial safety net 
constituted by deposit insurance” can lead to market failure because “[i]n good times, bank 
shareholders do well, while in extremely bad times the insurance fund bails out the bank’s depositors 
and debtholders”). Deposit insurance might also cause market failure by “worsen[ing] the incentives 
of depositors to monitor bank risk strategy.” GIANNI DE NICOLÒ ET AL., INT’L MONETARY FUND, 
EXTERNALITIES AND MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY 6 (2012), https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/
IMF006/12825-9781475504095/12825-9781475504095/12825-9781475504095_A001.xml [https://perma.cc/
LXT3-AXZS]. 
201 See, e.g., George J. Benston & George G. Kaufman, The Appropriate Role of Bank Regulation, 
106 ECON. J. 688, 688, 694-96 (1996) (concluding that bank capital regulation is necessary “to reduce 
the negative externalities resulting from government-imposed deposit insurance”). 
202 Kern Alexander & Steven L. Schwarcz, The Macroprudential Quandary: Unsystematic Efforts 
to Reform Financial Regulation, in RECONCEPTUALISING GLOBAL FINANCE AND ITS REGULATION 
127, 134-35 (Ross P. Buckley et al. eds., 2016). 
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controlling financial institution risk taking is relatively limited however,203 
focusing mostly on bank capital regulation.204 That scholarship has little 
relevance to this Article’s focus on regulation requiring central clearing.205 
Regulation requiring central clearing addresses a different market failure 
that causes externalities. Systemically important firms, by virtue of their 
systemic importance, may be motivated to engage in excessive risk taking. 
They would profit by, and therefore internalize the benefits of, successful risk 
taking; whereas if their risk taking fails, they either would be bailed out by 
the government (thereby externalizing losses onto the government and 
taxpayers)206 or would externalize much of the systemic harm of their failure 
onto other market participants and the public.207 
The primary goal of requiring central clearing should be to correct this 
market failure to the extent it arises from systemically important firms 
engaging in financial contracting.208 This Article thus limits its analysis to 
central clearing of nonderivative financial contracts that have at least one 
systemically important counterparty.209 Regulation requiring central clearing 
helps to correct this market failure by reducing the likelihood of a 
systemically important counterparty’s default.210 This explains why central 
clearing regulation is seen as a “notable exception” to the law’s reluctance to 
mandate specific risk-mitigation measures.211 
 
203 Cf. Gazi Ishak Kara & S. Mehmet Ozsoy, Bank Regulation Under Fire Sale Externalities 2 
(Fed. Reserve Bd., Finance and Economics Discussion Series No. 2016-26, 2016) (recognizing that 
“the guidance from theoretical literature on the regulation of liquidity and the interaction between 
liquidity and capital regulations is quite limited”). 
204 See, e.g., Marc Saidenberg & Til Schuermann, The New Basel Capital Accord and Questions 
for Research 2 (Wharton Fin. Insts. Ctr., Working Paper No. 03-14, 2003). 
205 Indeed, most of the financial institutions this Article discusses are not even deposit-taking 
banks. Cf. Financial Stability Oversight Council: Designations, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/8LBW-CAPE] 
(last updated Mar. 6, 2019, 4:22 PM) (stating that nonbank financial companies and financial market 
utilities can also be designated as SIFIs). Also, most SIFIs are bank holding companies that do not 
themselves take deposits. Id. 
206 See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
207 Schwarcz, supra note 145, at 770-71; see also Schwarcz, supra note 9, at 206 (explaining this 
externalization of systemic harm as “a type of tragedy of the commons”). It is a tragedy of the commons 
insofar as market participants suffer from the actions of other market participants; it is a more standard 
externality insofar as nonmarket participants suffer from the actions of market participants. 
208 That is a goal of macroprudential regulation, which (as discussed) refers to financial 
regulation that is concerned with the fundamental stability of the financial system, in contrast to 
microprudential regulation which is concerned primarily with the safety and soundness of individual 
financial institutions. See supra note 10. 
209 See supra text accompanying notes 94–95. 
210 See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text. 
211 Cf. Mülbert, supra note 197, at 395 (observing that central clearing regulation is a “notable 
exception” to that reluctance under EU law). 
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The foregoing analysis explains why central clearing can control 
systemic risk. Next consider mandating central clearing as a means of 
mutualizing, and thereby limiting, risk. 
B. Should Regulators Require Financial Institutions to Mutualize Risk? 
This question is effectively a subset of the prior question: if regulators 
should mandate how financial institutions control risk, should they require 
those institutions to mutualize risk? Although fully answering this question 
is beyond this Article’s scope, consider the following possible observations for 
beginning to answer it. 
Requiring central clearing through CCPs helps to mutualize default 
losses.212 Federal Reserve economists indeed observe that “[m]utualization of 
risk is . . . a key distinguishing feature of CCP risk management as compared 
to bank risk management.”213 Mutualization of risk is a form of private 
insurance; it generally refers to dividing a risk among multiple parties to 
reduce the chance that its occurrence will cause significant financial loss to 
any one party.214 Central clearing mutualizes clearing-and-settlement risk 
among a CCP’s clearing members, many of whom are systemically important 
firms,215 by making each responsible for paying specified amounts—such as 
contributing to a loss-absorbency fund and paying capital assessments as 
needed to keep the CCP solvent for the benefit of the CCP and its clearing 
members.216 That, in turn, corrects the market failure discussed in Section 
V.A by reducing the likelihood of any clearing member’s default. 
But correcting a market failure does not itself justify regulation. As 
discussed, proposed regulation additionally must satisfy a cost–benefit 
analysis.217 Part III has argued that central clearing may well satisfy that 
 
212 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
213 Cox & Steigerwald, supra note 15, at 7. 
214 See Roe, supra note 147, at 1660 (“This risk spreading would conceivably stop the first 
domino from falling. Or, if it falls anyway, the costs of its failure could be dissipated by multiple 
financial institutions taking a piece of the risk and small part of the loss.”). 
215 For example, the Options Clearing Corporation’s clearing members include Deutsche Bank 
Securities Inc., Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC, Wells Fargo Securities, LLC, and Citigroup Global 
Markets Inc. OPTIONS CLEARING CORP., supra note 118, at 47. Even if a clearing member is merely 
an affiliate of a systemically important firm, that firm is likely to support it. Cf. Arthur E. Wilmarth, 
Jr., How Should We Respond to the Growing Risks of Financial Conglomerates? (observing that “banks and 
other financial institutions have a powerful reputational interest in supporting their troubled nonbank 
subsidiaries, regardless of the formalities of corporate separation”), in FINANCIAL MODERNIZATION 
AFTER GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY 65, 81 (Patricia C. McCoy ed., 2002). 
216 See supra notes 163–67 and accompanying text. 
217 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 77, at 263 (explaining that “[c]ost-benefit analysis is best 
understood as a way for agencies to ensure that their decisions are informed”). Existing law at most 
requires a traditional cost–benefit analysis. See Schwarcz, supra note 98, at 167-68. 
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analysis, at least when applied to clearing standardized nonderivative 
financial contracts with one or more systemically important counterparties. 
Viewing central clearing as a way to mutualize risk raises a broader issue: 
would regulators be justified in going beyond clearing risk and requiring, for 
example, the mutualization of investment risk of systemically important firms? 
This issue has become important to the regulatory debate over whether to require 
a general privatized systemic risk fund—such as the Systemic Emergency 
Insurance Fund proposed by Professors Gordon and Muller218 or, by analogy to 
FDIC deposit insurance, the systemic risk fund subsidized by market-participant 
premiums proposed by Professor Anabtawi and the author.219 
From the standpoint of systemically harmful externalities, investment risk 
appears to be at least as critical as clearing risk. Recall that the counterparty risk 
that caused Lehman Brothers’ failure, which contributed to the financial crisis, 
arose because of its investments in MBS.220 Similarly, the counterparty risk that 
caused AIG’s near failure arose under derivatives contracts only because of the 
collapse of the MBS market.221 Even the so-called Volcker Rule,222 originally 
advocated for as a panacea for systemic financial instability,223 focuses exclusively 
on investment risk.224 The benefits of mutualizing investment risk of systemically 
important firms should therefore equal or exceed those of mutualizing those 
firms’ clearing risk. If the costs of mutualizing that investment risk are no greater 
than the costs of mutualizing that clearing risk, regulation requiring that 
mutualization of investment risk may well be justified.225 
 
218 Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd-Frank’s Dangers 
and the Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 151, 204-06 (2011). 
219 See Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 147, at 1401-02 (arguing that systemic risk regulation 
is justified by externalities and that a privatized systemic risk fund can “correct for risk-spillovers in 
financial markets by requiring firms to take into account the impact of their behavior on systemic 
stability”); cf. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response to the 
Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951, 1015-23 (2011) (arguing that systemically important firms 
should be required to pay risk-based insurance premiums which would be used to fund liquidation 
of failed firms and thus reduce potential bailout costs); Email Attachment from Paolo Saguato, supra 
note 15 (observing that the “mutualisation and privatization of the guarantee fund might push down 
the line the necessity of a public bailout”). Such a fund would represent a type of private ordering. 
Schwarcz, supra note 48, at 324-29. 
220 See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text. 
221 See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text. 
222 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, sec. 
619, § 13, 124 Stat. 1376, 1620 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012)). 
223 See, e.g., Jeff Merkley & Carl Levin, The Dodd-Frank Act Restrictions on Proprietary Trading 
and Conflicts of Interest: New Tools to Address Evolving Threats, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 515, 531-32 (2011). 
224 The Volcker Rule imposes limitations on proprietary trading in order to prevent banks and 
other systemically important firms from investing in risky assets. Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating 
Financial Change: A Functional Approach, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1441, 1486 (2016). 
225 Cf. supra note 217 and accompanying text (discussing cost–benefit analysis). 
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Normatively, however, one might question whether proposed financial 
regulation should be justified merely because it would correct a market failure 
and satisfy a traditional cost–benefit analysis.226 Scholars should consider 
whether regulators should go beyond that traditional analysis and also 
compare the costs and benefits of alternative reasonable regulatory 
proposals.227 For example, even assuming that the anticipated benefits of 
mutualizing risk through central clearing, or through a systemic risk fund, 
exceed its anticipated costs, regulators may want to—and perhaps should also 
be required to—compare the anticipated costs and benefits of reasonable 
alternatives, such as requiring private hedging against counterparty risk. 
CONCLUSION 
The United States and many other countries are requiring most derivatives 
contracts to be cleared through central counterparties. Regulators believe this 
central clearing requirement reduces counterparty risk, in turn reducing the 
risk that counterparty failure could trigger a systemic economic collapse. This 
Article examines whether the law should also require central clearing for 
nonderivative financial contracts, such as loan agreements, whose aggregate 
counterparty exposure greatly exceeds that on derivatives contracts. 
This Article shows that, contrary to media portrayal, the systemic riskiness 
of derivatives contracts turns on the nature of their counterparties, not on their 
inherent nature. This insight indicates that nonderivative financial contracts 
with systemically important counterparties could also be systemically risky. In 
theory, requiring those financial contracts to be centrally cleared could 
therefore help reduce systemic costs arising from that counterparty risk. 
Regulation imposing that requirement would be justified only if its overall 
reduction of systemic costs outweighs the requirement’s transaction costs. To 
reduce transaction costs, this Article proposes that any such regulation be 
further limited to material nonderivative financial contracts that are 
standardized. Because nonderivative financial contracts are increasingly being 
documented in standardized format, this proposal should not unduly limit 
the benefits of extending central clearing. 
In principle, the regulation should also achieve an overall reduction of 
systemic costs. Central clearing reduces systemic costs arising from the 
counterparty risk of individual systemically important firms. Although 
 
226 See supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text (observing that such an analysis is satisfied 
by showing that the anticipated benefits of specific proposed regulation should exceed the 
regulation’s anticipated costs). 
227 The author has separately argued for such a consequence-based inquiry to assess proposed 
regulation from alternative perspectives. See Schwarcz, supra note 98, at 169 (showing that in 
traditional cost–benefit analysis, “regulators only superficially consider alternatives”). 
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central clearing can also increase systemic costs by concentrating 
counterparty risk in CCPs, CCPs used to clear derivatives contracts are 
significantly protected from that risk concentration. This Article examines 
how those protections could be adapted to, and possibly also enhanced for, 
CCPs used to clear nonderivative financial contracts. 
Because its cost–benefit balancing is based on rough approximations, an 
untested premise, and possible differences in the benefits of multilateral 
netting,228 this Article does not conclude that regulation should necessarily require 
central clearing of nonderivative financial contracts. Instead, it argues that if the 
benefits of centrally clearing derivatives contracts exceed its costs, then the 
benefits of centrally clearing nonderivative financial contracts might also exceed 
its costs. This Article’s analysis nonetheless should help regulators think about 
expanding the central clearing requirement to nonderivative financial contracts. It 
also helps answer important legal questions about why, and the extent to which, 
regulators should mandate how financial institutions should control risk, and 
whether they should require financial institutions to mutualize risk.229 
  
 
228 See supra notes 109–23 and accompanying text. 
229 The author is separately examining how the insight that nonderivative financial contracts 
with systemically important counterparties could also be systemically risky informs derivatives 
regulation as well as financial regulation more generally. 
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APPENDIX 1: CENTRALLY CLEARING NONDERIVATIVE  
FINANCIAL CONTRACTS 
This Appendix 1 illustrates how nonderivative financial contracts could be 
centrally cleared and compares that to the central clearing of derivatives 
contracts. The comparison shows that, in principle, central clearing would 
work identically for clearing both types of contracts. In practice however, there 
would be one difference in clearing: because relatively more counterparties on 
derivatives contracts are likely to be CCP clearing members, CCPs clearing 
derivatives contracts could employ more multilateral netting than CCPs 
clearing nonderivative financial contracts. 
A. Central Clearing of Derivatives Contracts 
Assume that Parties A and B—both clearing members of a CCP—enter 
into a derivatives contract and that, on the settlement date a year hence, Party 
B is obligated to pay $1,000,000 to Party A. If this derivatives contract is 
centrally cleared, the CCP would be obligated to pay that $1,000,000 to Party 
A. Party A thus is subject to the CCP’s credit risk, not Party B’s credit risk. 
Once the CCP pays the $1,000,000 to Party A, the CCP has a 
reimbursement claim for that amount against Party B.230 Assuming Party B 
pays that amount to the CCP, the CCP is made whole. If Party B defaults on 
paying that amount to the CCP, the CCP might become financially distressed. 
To reduce that likelihood of financial distress, the CCP’s clearing 
members set credit criteria with which the CCP must comply when clearing 
a contract. To mitigate concentrating systemic risk in the CCP, regulators set 
the capitalization and other requirements by which clearing members support 
the CCP. Part IV of this Article discusses these criteria and requirements. 
B. Central Clearing of Nonderivative Financial Contracts 
Using this Article’s example of a loan agreement as a typical nonderivative 
financial contract, assume Party A makes a $1,000,000 loan to Party B, repayable 
in a year with 5% interest. At the loan’s maturity (i.e., settlement) date, Party B 
is obligated to repay Party A $1,000,000 principal and $50,000 interest. If this loan 
agreement is centrally cleared and Party A and Party B are clearing members, the 
CCP would be obligated to pay $1,050,000 to Party A on the settlement date. 
Party A thus is subject to the CCP’s credit risk, not Party B’s credit risk. 
Once the CCP pays the $1,050,000 to Party A, the CCP has a 
reimbursement claim for that amount against Party B. Assuming Party B pays 
 
230 See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
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that amount to the CCP, the CCP is made whole. If Party B defaults on paying 
that amount to the CCP, the CCP might become financially distressed. 
To reduce that likelihood of financial distress, the CCP’s clearing members 
set credit criteria with which the CCP must comply when clearing a contract; 
and to mitigate concentrating systemic risk in the CCP, regulators set the 
capitalization and other requirements by which clearing members support the 
CCP. Again, Part IV of this Article discusses these criteria and requirements. 
The foregoing comparison shows that central clearing would work 
identically, in principle, for clearing both derivatives contracts and 
nonderivative financial contracts. Next consider the difference, in practice, of 
clearing these different types of financial contracts. 
C. Central Clearing’s Difference in Practice 
This difference would turn on the CCP’s ability to engage in multilateral 
netting. Recall that multilateral netting refers to a CCP’s ability to net offsetting 
payment obligations among its clearing members.231 Because relatively more 
counterparties on derivatives contracts are likely to be CCP clearing members,232 
CCPs clearing derivatives contracts could employ more multilateral netting than 
CCPs clearing nonderivative financial contracts. Here’s why. 
A CCP clearing a derivatives contract between clearing members Party A 
and Party B may also be clearing other derivatives contracts involving one or 
more of these parties and other CCP clearing members, such as Party C. If 
Party A owes Party B $1,000,000 and Party B owes Party C $1,000,000, Party 
B’s offsetting obligations will be set off (i.e., netted) and Party A will simply 
owe Party C the $1,000,000.233 In contrast, a CCP clearing a nonderivative 
financial contract between clearing members Party A and Party B is less likely 
to be clearing other nonderivative financial contracts involving one or more 
of these parties and other CCP clearing members. 
The significance of this difference is unclear, however. Although 
multilateral netting can increase CCP operational efficiencies,234 it is less 
certain that it can reduce systemic risk. Going beyond the sources cited,235 
the author is personally skeptical that multilateral netting reduces systemic 
risk. The primary argument that it does reduce systemic risk is that it reduces 
the CCP’s aggregate counterparty risk exposure.236 Thus, in the previous 
 
231 See supra notes 109–18 and accompanying text. 
232 See supra notes 175–77 and accompanying text. 
233 See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
234 See supra note 123. 
235 See supra notes 119–23 and accompanying text. 
236 See supra note 119 and accompanying text; cf. supra text accompanying note 111 (discussing 
that multilateral netting allows for the aggregate offset of positions). 
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paragraph’s example,237 the CCP’s aggregate exposure to $2,000,000 of 
counterparty risk (owing $1,000,000 to Party B and $1,000,000 to Party C) is 
reduced to $1,000,000 (i.e., after multilateral netting, only owing $1,000,000 
to Party C). 
The possible fallacy of that argument is that it ignores the credit 
correlations and setoff rights that are inherent in the CCP’s chain of making 
payments. To understand why, compare multilateral netting and bilateral (i.e., 
the absence of multilateral) netting, in each case based on the prior example. 
With multilateral netting, after the CCP pays $1,000,000 to Party C, the CCP 
will seek reimbursement of that amount from Party A. If Party A reimburses 
the CCP, the CCP would be fine; but in the unlikely event Party A fails to 
reimburse the CCP, the CCP’s financial integrity would be threatened and it 
would have to seek the backup protections discussed in Part IV of this Article. 
With bilateral netting, the CCP would pay $1,000,000 to Party B and 
$1,000,000 to Party C. After the CCP pays $1,000,000 to Party C, the CCP will 
seek reimbursement of that amount from Party B. Because the CCP just paid 
that amount to Party B, Party B would almost certainly be able to pay the 
reimbursement. Furthermore, as a matter of law, the CCP should have the 
right to set off the $1,000,000 it is obligated to pay to and to receive as 
reimbursement from Party B.238 Party B therefore should not present a credit 
risk to the CCP. Party A, however, presents the same credit risk for bilateral 
as for multilateral netting. After the CCP pays $1,000,000 to Party B, the CCP 
will seek reimbursement of that amount from Party A. If Party A reimburses 
the CCP, the CCP would be fine; but in the unlikely event Party A fails to 
reimburse the CCP, the CCP’s financial integrity would be threatened and it 
would have to seek the backup protections discussed in Part IV of this Article. 
  
 
237 See supra text accompanying note 233. 
238 See supra note 9 and accompanying text (explaining that parties generally have the right to 
set off mutually offsetting matured obligations). 
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APPENDIX 2: STANDARDIZING NONDERIVATIVE  
FINANCIAL CONTRACTS 
This Appendix 2 explains how to standardize nonderivative financial 
contracts. The explanation should start with trying to understand the 
standardization of derivatives contracts. The meaning of standardizing a 
derivatives contract is somewhat ambiguous however. The most common 
interpretation is functional: if a CCP agrees to clear a derivatives contract, 
that contract is presumed to be standardized.239 Using this functional 
definition, a nonderivative financial contract would be presumed to be 
standardized if a CCP agrees to clear it. 
The Committee of European Securities Regulators has subdivided the 
concept of standardization into three components: legal uniformity, process 
uniformity, and product uniformity.240 Legal uniformity refers to “standard 
transaction documentation and definitions.”241 Contracts that are 
documented on ISDA forms are deemed to have legal uniformity.242 Because 
many nonderivative financial contracts are now documented on ISDA 
forms,243 such contracts would likewise be deemed to have legal uniformity. 
Efforts are also underway to further standardize loan agreements to help 
streamline the trading of participation interests in loans.244 
Process uniformity refers to the use of automated electronic systems to 
ensure that details of trades, such as transfers of securities and payments 
therefor, are accurately recorded.245 In the author’s experience, payments on 
 
239 See, e.g., Hearing to Examine the Regulation of Over-the-Counter Derivatives: Joint Hearing Before 
the H. Comm. on Agric. & the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 13 (2009) (statement of Hon. Timothy 
F. Geithner, Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury) (“We will employ a presumption that a derivative 
contract that is accepted for clearing by any central counterparty is standardized.”); INT’L SWAPS & 
DERIVATIVES ASS’N, PRODUCT REPRESENTATION FOR STANDARDIZED DERIVATIVES 4 (2011), 
https://www.isda.org/a/EHiDE/product-representation-for-standardized-derivatives-20110414vfinal1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UM74-3HF9] (defining standardized OTC derivatives as “broadly speaking those 
derivatives that will be centrally cleared or electronically executed”). 
240 COMM. OF EUROPEAN SEC. REGULATORS, STANDARDISATION AND EXCHANGE 
TRADING OF OTC DERIVATIVES 6 (2010), https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/
2015/11/10_610.pdf [https://perma.cc/6JPW-U4R9]. 
241 Id. at 6-7. 
242 Id. 
243 See supra notes 130–32 and accompanying text (observing this is being done to gain the 
advantage of bankruptcy law’s safe harbor exemptions). 
244 BRIDGET MARSH & TED BASTA, LOAN SYNDICATIONS AND TRADING: AN OVERVIEW 
OF THE LOAN SYNDICATIONS & TRADING ASSOCIATION AND THE LEVERAGED LOAN MARKET 
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material financial contracts involving sophisticated parties—the subset of 
contracts this Article discusses—are always recorded through automated 
electronic systems. All of the nonderivative financial contracts discussed in 
this Article should therefore have process uniformity. 
Product uniformity refers to financial products that have similar 
features.246 This Article uses loan agreements to exemplify nonderivative 
financial contracts.247 Because loan agreements have relatively straightforward 
repayment schedules for principal and interest, they clearly should represent 
a uniform product class. Indeed, at least one derivatives expert informed the 
author that loan agreements, as products, tend to be much more uniform than 
derivatives, in part because sellers want to retain control of the derivatives 
product market through customization.248 
The standardization of nonderivative financial contracts for CCP clearing 
thus appears to have a very low bar, encompassing at least all such contracts 
that (as is common) are documented on ISDA forms as well as all such 
contracts that a CCP in fact agrees to clear. This concept of standardization 
is very different, for example, from the custom and practice for standardizing 
letters of credit, which is necessary to enable low-level bank officers to 
determine, on a real-time basis and without knowledge of nonbanking 
terminology or the exercise of judgment, whether documents presented by 
the letter-of-credit beneficiary satisfy the payment conditions.249 
 
246 Id. at 9. 
247 See, e.g., supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
248 This observation is based on a discussion with P.R.I.M.E. Finance expert colleagues at the January 
22-23, 2018 annual conference in The Hague. These colleagues and the author are members of P.R.I.M.E. 
Finance’s Panel of Recognized International Market Experts in Finance, consisting of the most senior people 
in the financial markets. See About Us, P.R.I.M.E. FIN., https://primefinancedisputes.org/page/about-us 
[https://perma.cc/UA3R-DHZM]; cf. RUTTER ASSOCS. LLC, DEMYSTIFYING EXOTIC DERIVATIVES: 
WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW (2016), http://www.rutterassociates.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/
Demystifying-Exotic-Derivatives-What-You-Need-to-Know.pdf [https://perma.cc/KZ3T-QQVT] 
(discussing four categories of nonuniform derivatives). 
249 See, e.g., U.C.C. art. 5 prefatory note (AM LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977) 
(discussing the need for uniformity); U.C.C. § 5-108 cmts. 1, 8-9 (explaining that UCC Article 5 
changed its documentary review standard from “substantial compliance” to “strict compliance” to 
eliminate the need for bank officers to exercise judgment). 
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